

CURRENT History

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OF WORLD AFFAIRS

APRIL 1966

FRANCE TODAY

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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Coming Next Month

GERMANY, 1966

The May, 1966, issue of *Current History* will offer our readers an up-to-date view of today's Germany. In an effort to appraise the progress achieved and the problems still to be met, seven contributors will review the following areas in German affairs:

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by HANS A. SCHMITT, Professor of History, Tulane University;

Berlin and Unification

by KARL LOEWENSTEIN, Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College;

Germany and the two Europes

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Germany and the West

by HANS KOHN, Professor Emeritus of History, City College of New York;

Germany and the Underdeveloped World

WOLFE W. SCHMOKE, Assistant Professor of History, The University of Vermont;

The Economic Picture

by PATRICK BOARMAN, Associate Professor of Economics, Bucknell University;

German Society Today

by FELIX E. HIRSCH, Professor of History, Trenton State College.

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NO ADVERTISING

CURRENT History

APRIL, 1966

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In April, 1966, Current History offers its readers an appraisal of the French Fifth Republic—now almost eight years old. Assaying the mood of France today, our introductory author finds that “it may well be that the French, after a prolonged seven-year itch of stability, are, in 1966, feeling nostalgic for some turbulence.” But, he continues, “the profound modifications which have been effected in the social structure and in the mental adaptation of the French people to the modern world are likely to stay.”

A New France: Changes in French Society and Culture

By HENRI PEYRE
Sterling Professor of French, Yale University

THE FRENCH have for centuries seemed to be endowed, or afflicted, with a capacity—unmatched by any other nation in the West—to resist change and to persevere in a more or less traditional stability. They acclaim novelties in fashion, in the arts, in literary movements; until recently they thought little of having governments overturned every six months, a new constitution voted every three years or another educational reform installed before an earlier one had been tried. Foreign observers have called them fickle and unstable—knowing full well that there was more social stability, bordering on complacent stagnation, in France than elsewhere in the West. The French elections, except that which brought a clear majority to Charles de Gaulle in 1962, have never registered a sharp shift of votes such as has been seen in Germany and regularly in Britain. In the setting of their daily lives and in their mental habits, the French have been slow in “espousing their own age”

as their present leader put it, urging them not to enter into the future backward, “à reculons.”

The presidential contest of December, 1965, showed that nostalgia for the past has not altogether disappeared in France. The multiparty confusion and the vehement reluctance to agree to disagree appear to remain dear to many. A deep-seated fear of losing one's individuality in a consensus and of boredom still seems to dwell in the collective subconscious of the country. Yet profound changes have taken place between 1950 and the middle 1960's. They are psychological and social more than economic and political. The substructure of France and her moods have been altered.

This change should not be attributed to Gaullism, for the process began before de Gaulle, under the Fourth Republic. Gaullism was made possible and became popular because it endorsed the changes which had taken place and because it accelerated them.

If, in 1965, it lost its grip upon a substantial minority of the people, it was due to some impatience with the ominous and cryptic style of an arrogant leader, but also to the fact that, having reached a high plateau of prosperity, the French wanted to climb still higher and to share more generously among all the advantages which had accrued from what many call "Americanization."

Inquiries, questionnaires and statistics, especially in a country which has traditionally distrusted these methods, fail to reveal the extent of the psychological changes which are now transforming French society. Excessive reliance on these methods was in part responsible for the gross mistakes committed by observers of France in 1950-1958, who practically wrote France off as the chronic invalid of Europe. It hid from them—under an umbrella of apparent submersion in volatile politics and the obstinately insoluble problems of Indochina and North Africa—the immense progress actually being achieved.

French society has and is being altered by the habit of prosperity, by a mood of confidence in its future, by a sense (perhaps deceptive) of security, since for the first time in half a century the country is neither at war nor fears the oncoming of a war, as well as by a shift of the population away from tilling the soil to industry, technology and the professions.

Facts and figures have been profusely displayed in American weeklies, in *The Economist* and in Swiss and German papers to illustrate the miraculous progress effected since 1950. British observers have noted, at times with a little spite, that their Gallic neighbors seemed to have struck a way "to spend themselves rich" and that their rate of steady growth has been twice as fast as that of "moral" Britain. They have even suggested taking a leaf or two from the French book and importing into England the French system of planning, the *Conseil d'Etat* and a version of the French method of selecting and training civil servants. The progress, however, was actually largely due, at least at the start, to American assistance in gifts, loans and know-how. It was due also to a

happy conjunction of events that took place over the years.

The nightmare of being deficient in coal, which had obsessed the French for a century, was dispelled when hydroelectric energy and oil became greater assets than coal. Even steel, in which Britain and Germany outproduced France, became relatively less important, as chemicals, electronics, new alloys and plastics became more so. France stands high (fourth) in the world among the producers of uranium. Figures are eloquent and tell part of the story. In ten years, coal will be down from 76 per cent to 28 per cent as a source of the total power used in France. Consumption of oil, much of it from Africa, is being paid more and more in francs and no longer drains dollars away. In 1965, consumption of electric energy was double what it had been in 1955. 43 per cent of French families in 1964 had a car, as against 21 per cent in 1954; 34 per cent had TV instead of one per cent in 1954; 47 per cent had a refrigerator as against 7.5 per cent and 35 per cent a washing machine as against 8.4 per cent in 1954.

The daily life and the structure of society in France have naturally been affected by these changes. The share of food in the total expense of French families has gone down from 49 per cent in 1950 to 38.7 per cent in 1963; less also is spent on clothes; but more is expended on housing, machinery and health. The savings in the state saving banks (*caisses d'épargne*) have increased 400 per cent in ten years. The treasury had a comfortable gold reserve of over five billion dollars in 1965 and it is still increasing. Taxes, in a country often maligned—by others and itself—as evading them, bring a surplus in the budget. The 1966 budget was voted (with a surplus) as far ahead of time as October 31, 1965.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

But the real significance of this great economic progress lies in the social consequences it has entailed for France. Labor unrest has not been conspicuous in the last decade, except for a miners' strike in 1964 which was

not handled skillfully by the government and which in effect voiced the fears of the miners whose role in the total economy is threatened as coal is being replaced by other fuel. It is often not realized that the proportion of industrial workers who belong to the once all-powerful C.G.T. (*Confédération Générale du Travail*) is now relatively low (1.5 million in 1964 as against 5.5 million in 1946) and is conspicuously small in the new industries: oil, electronics, chemicals. The "alienation" of the workmen from the community is becoming an old-fashioned concept, as the working class—disposing of consumer goods in abundance, buying electrical appliances, automobiles (of which there is a higher percentage per capita than in any other European country), purchasing durable goods on installment—now easily feels the equal of the once superior bourgeois class.

The Communist vote still amounts to slightly over one fifth of the electorate; but the number of party members is only one fourth of what it was after the Liberation, while the party's policies are vacillating and contradictory. It is suspected that a sizable proportion of nominal Communists voted for de Gaulle repeatedly; the prestige of Russia, which was at its highest in 1943–1948, has steadily waned with the fissions in the Communist bloc and the downgrading of Russian agricultural and military power in world opinion since 1962. The presidential elections of December, 1965, have dispelled the myth of de Gaulle's invincibility; but they have also underlined the powerlessness of the French Left to offer anything else than a negative program. The votes which were collected by de Gaulle's opponents (Communists, Socialists, Radicals, Catholics and Rightists) could never have united on a common policy. A labor party, such as Léon Blum once dreamt of, gathering the electors of the working classes, the liberal intellectuals and disregarding the clerical issue, remains an impossibility in France, and apparently elsewhere on the continent. More well-being

(*bien être* or rather *mieux être*), which has become the new motto, is certainly desired by the working classes; but their wages have increased—especially in the private sector—and the cost of living remained practically steady in 1964–1965 when moves to curb inflation brought about a slight recession. There are fewer than thirty thousand unemployed, less than one per cent of the labor force, and these are from the industries (naval construction, textiles) where the need for modernization is most crying.

The most remarkable social and psychological change, in a nation of *groggnards*, where griping and declaiming against the government are a time-honored tradition and optimism is taken to be a sign of naivety, is in the now openly declared confidence about the future. Gaston Berger, an industrialist who has become a professor of philosophy, the eminent political thinker, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt in their *Plaidoyer pour l'Avenir*, Pierre Bauchet in his volume on economic planning¹ and many others in France have lately been attempting, not only to forecast the future, but, within limits, to control it. French opinion was impressed in 1965 by a collective work done by the National Commission for the Organization of the Territory: that Committee, made up of sober research specialists in economic sociology, concluded that, by 1985, France would have a population of sixty million people, half of them or more under 35 years of age; that the Frenchman would then be the richest man in Europe with the national output trebled, the agrarian population down to two million, less than 10 per cent of a twenty-two million labor force.

Another nightmare, even blacker than the dearth of coal, has cast a pall of gloom over the French mind for eighty years: the certainty that, with their population stagnant, they could never face Germany on an equal footing. That fear has now vanished. Germany appears to be divided for many years to come and, with the French birthrate now being considerably higher than the German, and than the European average, France will soon be a younger country, with more people reach-

¹This work was published in English as *Economic Planning: the French Experience* (London: Heineman, 1964).

ing conscription age every year than once-dreaded Germany.

That factor, and the realization that, industrially and commercially, France has more than held her own in the Common Market relative to Germany account for the prevailing sense of security. The contrast with the anxiety which demoralized France between 1933 and 1939 is sharp indeed. Anguish serves as a fashionable theme in today's literature and dissertations on the absurd still follow in the wake of Camus, Beckett and Ionesco, but few signs of genuinely lived anguish are discernible among French youth.

The new military bill, much to the dismay of the old guard and after being twice turned down by the senate, was voted in 1965. It provides for many exemptions from the draft, a standing army down to less than fifty per cent of its number in 1962 and, for all practical purposes, an *armée de métier*, such as had been advocated by de Gaulle as early as 1934. The old concepts of war which used to be traditional in Europe have been exploded: struggles waged on the battlefield, the taking of prisoners, the disarming of the enemy, and the occupation of his homeland. The present-day desire of the French is not to expand their army, which would merely serve as cannon fodder in the face of foes equipped with advanced aviation and atomic bombs, or which might encourage the Americans to withdraw their own forces from Europe. They do not seriously believe that Russia will constitute a threat to Western Europe for at least a decade or that either of the superpowers will resort to the use of the bomb; but they, like the Germans, are wary of an agreement between America and Russia which would cease to use the threat as a possible means of deterrence.

Other changes which have gradually altered French society in the last decade are: the strengthening of the middle class and, in spite of the loud proclamations of existentialist philosophers, the weakening of the Hegelian "unhappy conscience" with which the bourgeoisie may have been afflicted between the two world wars; the growing freedom of women and the consequent new

spirit in which the relations between the two sexes are envisaged; and the profound transformation of the peasantry.

CLASS AND MARRIAGE IN FRANCE

It is a mistake frequently made in America to imagine, from the reading of Balzac, Flaubert and Mauriac and from an insidious absorption of the Marxist critique of society, that the stratification of the classes in France is very rigid, that intermarriages (cutting across religious, economic, social or racial hurdles) are a rare occurrence, and that the middle class is uniformly sclerosed, complacent and selfish, hence doomed. The fortunes of the upper bourgeoisie have repeatedly been undermined by inflation and by all the loans made by France to foreign countries which never repaid them. Access to all the advantages once enjoyed by the privileged middle class (secondary and higher education, long vacations and travel abroad, epicurean tastes) has long been granted to all. Education is free at all levels and if there are relatively very few sons and grandsons of industrial and agrarian workers studying in the universities, there are many of their grandsons and great grandsons; the usual procedure has been for the sons first to become modest schoolteachers or minor employees and then to raise their children above their own level. The failure of nerve which undermined the bourgeoisie for a time has disappeared. That class, an open, loose and flexible one, is constantly being renovated through infusion of new elements from below. It has evolved generous movements such as the *Jeunes Patrons* and renounced paternalism in many industries. It has produced a very large majority of the vigorous leaders in most professions, the most inventive technicians, the most gifted artists and writers, including those who, like Mauriac, Malraux, Breton, Sartre, and de Gaulle himself (who, since his family was always poor and lived in relative insecurity, has declared that he never felt at one with the bourgeoisie), have often maligned the very group from which they stemmed.

According to several recent inquiries by

sociologists—the latest conducted by Alain Girard and reported by the National Institute of Demographic Studies in 1965—young marriages have become standard procedure in France: the average age is 21 for women, 24 for men. The couples meet at dances, winter sports, summer resorts, and more and more while working together as students, as social workers, or in church activities. The marriages are no longer arranged by the families but they are approved by them in 80 per cent of the cases. Nine weddings out of ten are accompanied by a church ceremony. The proportion of married women having a profession other than housewife is, next to that of Russia, the highest of any country. Of 18.2 million French women over fifteen, 6.6 million, in 1964, had a job other than housewife or in addition to that of housewife. The concept of the wife as *camarade*, of the girl going out with young men and splitting expenses (the practice of steady dating has not yet afflicted the French youth) has spread widely today. The comradeship, however, means sharing on the part of the wife more than by the male, who still resists assisting with household chores and who often is encouraged in this by his wife, who seems to fear that he might lose some of his virility thereby and some of the respect which the children should entertain for him. In 1965, another breach was made on the Code Napoleon when it was voted that the rights of married women would be vastly enlarged: they can now retain the property they owned before marriage, hold a job without the husband's consent and enjoy full financial autonomy. At the same time, the old-fashioned practice of the dowry is gradually disappearing.

THE PEASANTRY

An even more drastic change has taken place in the peasantry. A very competent American historian, Gordon Wright, has described it² and French writers have entitled

² See his *Rural Revolution in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

³ For example, *Serge Wallet* in his book of this title (Paris, 1962).

their inquiries on the subject: *Les Paysans contre le Passé*.³ The agricultural population at one time counted approximately fifty per cent of the French people and for years it was customary for the French, and for foreign observers of France, to praise the "classical" solidity and stability afforded by such a harmonious balance between agriculture and industry, the forces of the past and those of modern technology. As late as 1954, rural employment still amounted to 27.3 per cent of the labor force; it was down to 20 per cent in 1963. Cooperatives have been developed, the regrouping of land has been organized, improved efficiency through modernization has doubled, or trebled, production. There were 35,000 tractors in use in 1948, there are 800,000 or more today; there were 260 combines (harvester-thresher), today there are over 60,000; the use of fertilizers is up 300 per cent.

The results are clear: first, France has joined the ranks of the countries (America, Canada, Argentina, Australia) for which the exporting of a substantial part of their agrarian production (grains, cheese, fruits, vegetables, even butter and, some years, meat) is a question of life or death. No government can afford to sacrifice the outlets for its peasantry; several riots of peasants in Brittany, in Provence, in Languedoc, in 1961 and 1963, brought this fact home. Of all the countries of Western Europe, France has an unrivalled capacity for the expansion of her farm production and she cannot jeopardize that position when negotiating with her Common Market partners or with Britain. Her peasants have thus had to forsake their reactionary turn of mind and their attachment to old routines, whereas they had never shown much political maturity before and had voted placidly for old-fashioned radicalism. Suddenly they have realized their power; they produce leaders and lobbyists and join unions. Social security has been extended to six million agricultural workers. The "Complementary Law to the Law of Agricultural Orientation," passed on July 27, 1962, has provided for the recovery by the state, for the profit of the farmers, of untilled land

and even of abandoned or unkept houses in the villages, for the right of preemption by state organized groups of *aménagement foncier*, for the reparation of small areas cut up through the Napoleonic Code and for the prevention of the buying up of too much land (*accaparement*) by wealthy landowners. The psychological attitudes of the peasantry as well as their relative place in French society have changed more since 1948 or 1950 than they had for a hundred years before.

All these changes have virtually turned an old and traditionalist country into a new France. The French are not always aware of it; they insist on stressing all that remains to be done and on blaming their government for failing to accomplish it fast enough. Yet the chances are that future historians will view de Gaulle's France as having done more toward an actually lived socialism than any earlier regime or Popular Front. More has been achieved by Edgar Pisani, de Gaulle's energetic minister of agriculture, than by any of his predecessors of the Third and Fourth Republics, as the London *Economist* acknowledged in an article of July 27, 1963, on "The Vanishing Peasant." The London *Times Literary Supplement*, in 1964, blandly chided the glib allusions to France as the "sick man" of Europe and added: "The virtual failure of British postwar economic policy has occurred during a decade when the French have achieved an economic growth no less miraculous than that of the Western Germans." The American *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* of October, 1964, stressing the thorough transformation of French society, remarked: "France, formerly a conservative society of small shopkeepers and industrialists with the lowest rate of economic growth and of population increase in Europe, has been converted into a rapidly growing nation with ambitious economic planning on a national scale, a growing base of high-grade scientific research and a growing readiness to use new technologies...." Further, de Gaulle's premier, Georges Pompidou, declared on September 16, 1964, before the French National Assembly: "France has a socialist economy and it is here to stay."

EDUCATION TODAY

Education has never ceased to be under discussion in France. Parents take a lively personal interest in the schools, the syllabi of studies, the quality of the teachers, the sacrosanct baccalaureate and the competitive exams for the *Grandes Ecoles*. Teachers are divided into several categories (primary, technical, secondary, university), each highly jealous of its prerogatives, clamoring for reforms provided they affect other sectors than their own. Much grumbling is heard against the government's latest attempts at reorganization which have lacked consistency and clarity. But the criticism is negative. No alternative to the reforms now being achieved has been constructively formulated.

The Fourth Republic, in its thirteen years, evolved theoretical projects which were never seriously debated, for fear of antagonizing one or another of the parties which made up its frail and shifting majority. Today's Fifth Republic has not done enough, but the whole substructure of the country is nevertheless being altered through some of its educational reforms, accomplished under the pressure of events. The main changes may be summed up thus:

- 1) Huge increases in the educational budget of the country: from two billion francs in 1952 and four billion in 1957, the budget jumped to 17 billion for 1966 (easily equivalent to 10 or 11 billion of the 1957 value). Scientific research, which received 179 million in 1958, will receive 1,298 million in 1966, an increase of 620 per cent. The strongest reason behind the adoption of the nuclear and space programs, initiated by the Fourth Republic and pursued by de Gaulle, lies neither in the pursuit of prestige nor of military efficiency (although it was necessary to pacify a disgruntled army after independence was granted to Algeria): it lies in the wish to give a strong impetus to French science through research contracts arranged, as in the United States, by the army.

- 2) Adoption in 1964, after years of debate, of the old projects for the *Ecole Unique*, providing for a more democratic primary teach-

ing and for the easier access of a much larger number of children of modest means to secondary and higher education. Secondary teaching, which counted 70,000 children in 1900, will have three million in 1970. It is free. Next to Sweden, France is the European country in which the highest number of children continue from primary to secondary education. France turns out three times more *bacheliers* than Western Germany. Twice as many students as in Britain enter the universities after secondary studies, although this is not an unmitigated good, for the less competent of those, especially in the sciences, eventually fail and are a drag on the others and a burden to the professors. Similarly, the number of girls who go on to the "faculties of letters" is twice as high as that of the males; hence there are too many students in these faculties (137,000 in 1964–1965), and only 129,000 (when more would be desirable, and two thirds are men) in the faculties of sciences.

3) Much building of schools has been done in the last four years; the increase in professors and assistants at the higher (or university) level has been greater proportionately than that of students. Still Paris—the Sorbonne, with its new faculties lately opened at Nanterre, the Halle aux Vins, the Halle aux Cuir—is overcrowded. Out of 300,000 university students in France (over one fourth of them on scholarship), 100,000 are in Paris. The astronomical figure of 750,000 is forecast for 1970. Luckily, since 1962, the rate of increase has been higher at the universities of Strasbourg (68 per cent), Aix (50 per cent), Lyon (50 per cent), Dijon (40 per cent) than at Paris.

4) The baccalaureate has undergone changes, not always for the better, far too often since 1958. The general trend however is toward more sciences, less stress on Latin, more room given to economic and social studies. Far more remains to be achieved. Economics remains wedded, at the university

level, to the law schools and is too theoretical. Too much teaching in France is overly rigid and overly abstract. The ruling classes, between 1929 and 1939, committed grievous mistakes because they knew far too little about inflation, deflation, devaluation, Keynesian economics, the need for mass production.

5) The excessive rigidity of French educational and social structures is now being broken down through a number of ways in which the baccalaureate may be bypassed. Engineers at a high level are very highly and scientifically trained in France and are in fact more numerous than in West Germany. But the crying need is for many more superior technicians, trained in two years, as opposed to the more mathematically trained engineers whose training lasts from three to seven years. Ten *Instituts universitaires de Technologie* are to be opened in 1966: some already exist—at Lyon, Toulouse, Rennes and Lille, as a beginning.

6) An original feature of French education, and one of the factors which have characterized the whole of the French society over generations, is the *Grandes Ecoles*: *Ecole Normale Supérieure* (80 admitted yearly), *Ecole Polytechnique* (300), *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (80). The elite of France, which constitutes the backbone of the country, is trained there. This open elite is far more educational and cultural than hereditary or social. Among the men now around de Gaulle, Pompidou and Alain Peyrefitte are former *Normaliens*; Louis Joxe is an *agréé*; Couve de Murville, Chaban Delmas, Giscard d'Estaing and Bernard Clappier were *inspecteurs des finances*; the last two, like Louis Armand, had previously graduated from the *Ecole Polytechnique*. As mentioned earlier, British observers of France have lately expressed their admiration for the French training of an elite of civil servants.⁴ One of these British observers has credited the remarkable social and economic achievement of France, in spite of parliamentary instability, and de Gaulle's subsequent achievement, to that "cadre of high functionaries, . . . often astonishingly young, . . . in whom class consciousness has been replaced by a sort of caste

⁴ See "France's Ladder to the Top" in the June 30, 1962, issue of the London *Economist*, page 1319; and "The French Paradox" in the July, 1963, issue of *Encounter*.

consciousness based on their educational success and their privileges of power."

THE ARTS

Another article would be needed to include a sketch of literature and the arts in France over the last decade. French achievement in the arts is the one best known in the United States where new French books are voraciously read and translated, French music is played generously, French art is shown and bought though often criticized by American art critics anxious to serve the prestige of their own New York and California schools. Strangely enough, while the country is going through a tremendous social and psychological upheaval and facing the future as it has not done since Napoleon III, or even since Bonaparte's Consulate, displaying faith in itself and in the future, and not a little arrogance in its attitude to the rest of the world, literature seems to indulge pessimism, portrays impotence, morbidity, Hamlet-like doubts about itself and masochistically reviles the very concept of literature. An ironical paradox is that, while the president is by far the greatest master of literary prose to have occupied the symbolic throne of France for centuries and prizes intellectuals (Malraux, Joxe, Debré, Jeanneney, *et al.*, all authors) above the militaries whom, except for Mauriac, he scorns, the outstanding French writers of today who may some day be called the luminaries of the Gaullist age are all adverse to him: Sartre, Aragon, Robbe-Grillet, Butor, Simone de Beauvoir, Violette Leduc, or indifferent to his appeals for grandeur and glory.

The achievements of the Division of Cultural Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been significant: over 30,000 French teachers serve abroad in Africa, North America and elsewhere. There are 66 cultural counselor posts abroad, eight of them including a scientific attaché; 177 French lycées and colleges abroad, attended by over 300,000 pupils at the secondary level. Over 40,000 foreign students study in France. Book exports increased 10 per cent in 1964 over the preceding year and represent 20 per cent

of French book production. The French effort in this domain is more energetic, and more generously provided, than that of any other country. It was endorsed on June 10, 1964, by the adoption of the second plan for cultural expansion abroad.

In France, where André Malraux is in charge of what is called "Cultural Affairs" (a separate ministry from that of National Education and from the Division of Cultural Relations at the Quai d'Orsay), national theaters have been reorganized and their subsidy has been raised from 23 million francs in 1959 to nearly 54 million in 1966. Buildings have been cleaned and renovated. The prestige of artists has been enhanced by national funerals in great state arranged for Braque and Le Corbusier, and by official orders for the decorating of ceilings to Chagall and André Masson. TV has brought about a severe crisis for the cinema, which is not yet over. But the chief character of cultural life has been its decentralization. Paris is no longer the cradle of innovations. Much admired *Maisons de la Culture* have been opened at Havre, Caen, Ménilmontant and at Bourges. Over twelve dramatic centers are active in the provinces and music festivals are mushrooming in as many cities. For the first time in a century and a half, the attraction of Paris as the magnet for intellectuals and artists and as a crucible for all innovations has paled and many professors and innova-

(Continued on page 241)

Henri Peyre was born and educated in France. In 1925, he began his teaching career at Bryn Mawr. Since then he has served on the faculties of the University of Cairo, Lyons University and, of course, Yale, where he has been head of his department since 1939. He has lectured at Cornell, Chicago University and at the University of Buenos Aires. He is the author of numerous articles and books, the most recent of which are *The Splendors of Christendom* (New York: Time-Life Publications, 1964) and *The Literature of France* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Studying the French presidential election of 1965, this observer points out that "What the French will have to recognize before they will be able to re-establish a healthy constitutional republic is that the monetary inflation and governmental instability that marked the course of the Fourth Republic and are now recalled with such unalloyed revulsion actually saved France from probable disaster." As he sees it, the type of personal rule established by Charles de Gaulle "is bound, sooner or later, to run counter to the interests and wishes of the citizens."

The Tragic Victory of Charles de Gaulle

By EDWARD WHITING FOX

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A YEAR AGO it was still possible to accept Charles de Gaulle as the unchallenged spokesman of the large majority of Frenchmen and the defender of the essential interests of France and of Europe and the West. Today any such claim would be preposterous. In spite of his reelection, his leadership was rejected by a majority of his countrymen, and his intentions, not only present but also past, have been seriously questioned as a result of last fall's presidential campaign. Seldom has a major statesman suffered such a loss of stature so quickly.¹

In a sense, however, what has been de Gaulle's loss has been France's gain. For the first time in a decade, the country has shown signs of political vitality; and in spite of the ominous threat of the General's remaining months in power, there is hope that France may resume her leadership in Europe.

The action which produced this extraordinary transformation, fittingly, follows the structure and exhibits many of the characteristics of classic drama. It occurred, for example, in five recognizable acts, and the cast of characters included the aging king, a false pretender (Gaston Defferre), nobles of

the court (assorted Gaullists), exiles plotting return to power (Guy Mollet, Pierre Mendès France and the others of the Fourth Republic), and two contending princes (François Mitterrand and Jean Lecanuet). There are character development and disintegration, intrigue, treachery, noble talk and fateful decisions. There are also low comedy and anticlimax, but the denouement is not traditional. The old king refuses to leave his throne; young Hotspur turns out to be a happy Hamlet, and the apparent heir is left waiting in the wings for his triumphal entry which, he sends word to the audience, will take place in the next performance.

There is no little irony in the fact that this astonishing drama was produced by the device of the direct popular election of the President, which had been imposed on France by de Gaulle himself in 1962. In reaction to this move the national assembly overthrew the ministry, bringing about its own dissolution. Forty-eight per cent of the registered voters gave the amendment a 66 per cent majority in a listless referendum; but only 32 per cent voted for Gaullist candidates in the ensuing general election. The mechanics of the electoral system, however, translated this into some 48 per cent of the seats in the

¹ See my article, "The France of Charles de Gaulle," *Current History*, December, 1964, pp. 332 ff.

assembly which, with the total alliance of the small block of votes controlled by Giscard d'Estaing, provided de Gaulle with a solid majority of 10. If his prestige was not enhanced by this puzzling maneuver, his personal power, which had been unquestioned, was then unassailable. What he would use it for was not clear, but those who considered themselves the opposition recognized that he could not be challenged again until he came up for reelection in the fall of 1965.

DEFERRE'S CANDIDACY

The first act of the subsequent drama was written by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber, the editor of the leading news weekly, *l'Express*. His argument, drawn from the 1962 election but focused on the 1965 contest, was that de Gaulle and his followers would easily dominate a divided opposition, but that there were enough anti-Gaullist votes to defeat the General if they could be unified behind a single candidate. In a spectacular display of journalism, he built up suspense week after week in a search for the necessary leader, "Monsieur X." The inevitable anticlimax of the unveiling was hardly offset by the pleasant but undistinguished figure of Gaston Defferre, and the campaign languished from the very start. For one thing, it was launched much too early and, for another, it lacked concrete issues.

Even if de Gaulle was far from popular, he was widely accepted. His achievement of peace in Algeria had won the heartfelt support of virtually the entire population of metropolitan France and, in addition, the country was prosperous for the first time in the memory of all but the oldest citizens. Even if de Gaulle's claims to credit for this happy state of affairs were obviously spurious (the real cause being the economic planning of the much maligned Fourth Republic and its development of the Common Market), the French were as little likely as other voters to "turn out Santa Claus," particularly since they did not share the Anglo-Saxon distrust of "administrative government" when it clearly served the public interest.

Moreover, "Monsieur X" was not only

launched too early, he was also the wrong candidate. In spite of his admirable personal qualifications, he painfully lacked the public appeal so necessary to a national figure. A meeting of the non-Communist opposition, called to endorse his candidacy in the early summer of 1965, broke up in hopeless confusion and mutual recrimination. This was taken by the French themselves as evidence of their own political irresponsibility and incoherence. Deffere's inadequacy was missed, and the real lesson—that a total non-Communist coalition was neither possible nor desirable—was not even suspected. At the end of August, as the French returned from vacation, the impending presidential election appeared to be no more than a formality of the kind de Gaulle had obviously planned.

The second act was carefully contrived by Charles de Gaulle himself. He wrote the opening and closing speeches with the greatest care, added an "excursion" and a false "alarum" and arranged an "exit" that should have left him an empty stage. Two parts, however, were ad-libbed and the entire act was played against the accompaniment of catcalls from the audience and the voices of other actors rehearsing a different script off-stage. The first scene was the "press conference" of September 9, 1965, in which the General delivered a strange monologue that seemed to sum up his career (he enumerated the number of cabinet meetings he had held, the interviews he had given, the hands he had shaken, and so forth, in apparent imitation of the abdication speech of Charles V in 1555), rather than to announce his candidacy, the only subject of interest to his audience. About that question, he promised to talk in due time, which he implied would be two months.

With Deffere out and de Gaulle not talking, it began to look as though there might be no campaign; but in the rest of his speech the General discussed Europe and NATO in terms that the press described as "a first class funeral." Although few guessed it at the time, this diatribe turned out to have provided the issue that was to jeopardize its author's reelection. Previously, de Gaulle

had never really lived up to his reputation as an anti-European. Even his veto of Britain's bid for entry had come to be accepted in the interest of European unity and his recall of the French representatives from Brussels at the end of June, 1965, had seemed justified if unfortunate. But this speech struck a new and ominous note.

MITTERAND ON THE LEFT

The announcement the following day that François Mitterrand would stand as the candidate of the Left hardly seemed to fit the script but neither did it seem to threaten anything but his own career, which in any case appeared to have more past than future. Having been one of the youngest and most successful politicians of the Fourth Republic was hardly any recommendation now, and his open bid for Communist support seemed to reveal suicidal tendencies. Not even the blessing of Mendès France and the endorsement of Guy Mollet, it was felt, could counteract his defiance of that taboo.

Of the other actor-candidates then on stage, two were of no significance and the third, Tixier Vignancourt, could not hope to command more than a small fraction of the total vote. He had, however, delighted the French with his barnstorming campaign through seaside resorts with a circus-like caravan during the summer. The only possible rival for de Gaulle was still believed to be the ubiquitous Antoine Pinay and the only serious hope of the opposition seemed to lie in persuading him to run. Having "saved the franc" twice, he was the darling of the conservatives and the *bête noir* of the proletariat. As old as de Gaulle, he implied he had had enough of public life; but he seemed no more eager to make a final decision than the General.

Late in September, Georges Pompidou made an official visit to the Department of the Ardennes. This scene, played before the curtain, made it seem that de Gaulle might be trying out his prime minister as a possible successor. If he did have any such ideas (which he certainly did not) they would have been shattered. Pompidou's political appeal

proved to be zero and so also did the political consciousness of the Ardennais. In spite of considerable unemployment in the area, he attracted few spectators and no protests or demonstrations. One handful of workers displayed a placard demanding "*Pompidou des sous*" which might be translated as "Can you spare a dime." The outstretched palm had replaced the clenched fist for these men who seemed to prefer soliciting the favor of de Gaulle's paternalistic state to challenging its authority.

During October, Mitterrand gradually got his campaign under way. Surprisingly, the Communist central committee decided to give him the Party's vigorous support in spite of his refusal to give any commitments in return except a warning that he would advocate a foreign policy oriented toward cooperation with the West through Europe, NATO, and the United Nations. The rest of his platform—developed in a series of speeches, mainly to meetings of politicians and journalists—stressed social and economic reforms which, he insisted, could be financed by the savings he would make by scrapping de Gaulle's *force de frappe*. In an obvious attempt to break de Gaulle's near monopoly of the women's vote, he advocated the repeal of antiquated laws on birth control and the expansion and reform of the equally antiquated system of state education.

PINAY WITHDRAWS

Even though an uneven performer Mitterrand revealed flashes of real eloquence and oratorical power. Given a chance, he might turn into a formidable campaigner if not a charismatic leader. Against a "successor," if de Gaulle retired, Mitterrand might be a threat, assuming that Communist leader Waldeck Rochet could deliver his votes and that Guy Mollet would not desert him for Pinay. That last eventuality, however, was eliminated by Pinay's simultaneous withdrawal from the campaign and his endorsement of de Gaulle which knowledgeable observers were sure had been imposed by the General by means as discreditable to author as to actor.

LECANUET OF THE M.R.P.

To fill the void Pinay left in the Center, the young president of the Catholic M.R.P. (*Movement Républicain Populaire*), Jean Lecanuet, stepped from the wings with the announcement that he would run. Totally unknown to the public, he made this entry as a gesture in defense of the Common Market, which he believed de Gaulle now threatened. Without question the most attractive of the candidates—and not merely for his dazzling smile—he had few other political assets and the serious handicap that the electors to whom he would have to appeal were all old supporters of de Gaulle.

His task, and that of the other opposition candidates, however, was facilitated by a number of unexpected distractions which completely changed the intended mood of the play. At the beginning of the fall, the fifth French plan (for economic development) was presented first to the economic and social council, an official advisory body, and then to the national assembly and the senate. The preceding four plans had been credited for much of the country's economic revival and relative prosperity, and few would have expected the fifth to be subjected to such devastating scrutiny. Nonetheless, day after day the papers carried reports of its merciless analysis by France's leading experts and statesmen. Lack of adequate provision for new investment, due to the enormous outlay for the *force de frappe* and to the government's deflationary policies, was held largely responsible for the increasing stagnation of the nation's economy. France, the figures showed, was lagging behind her European neighbors in investment, wages, housing, auto-routes, telephones, hospitals and schools. An adequate plan, moreover, would depend on the reversal of the government's chief policies: i.e., unification of Europe, the acceptance of foreign (American) capital, the abandonment of the *force de frappe* and the expansion of credit even at the risk of inflation.

A second major theme was provided by the "return to school" in September. No na-

tion takes the education of its children more seriously than France. Until recently, higher education was the jealously guarded preserve of the bourgeoisie and the principal defense of their privileged position. Following World War II, however, it became clear that the system would have to be radically expanded to take care of the rapidly growing population, and modernized and made available to talent without relation to social or economic status.

Just such a total reform, prepared by the appropriate authorities and put into effect in 1965, was by unanimous agreement a complete fiasco. Students had to be turned away for lack of space. Changes in the curriculum and state examinations (especially the famous "bac") suited no one. And the possibility of a worker's son breaking into the elite of the *Grandes Ecoles* seemed as remote as ever. Christian Fouchet, the minister of education, may well have been the most unpopular man in France.

Less spectacular but hardly less important was the situation created by France's boycott of the Common Market which left the French peasants, who had been urged to make heavy investments in machinery and fertilizer to enable them to meet vastly expanded demands, dangerously overextended. Endless emergency meetings of peasant organizations inevitably arrived at the conclusion that their unhappy plight could only be resolved by returning to the Brussels negotiations.

DE GAULLE'S APPEAL

In what was clearly intended to be the pivotal speech, not merely of the act, but of the play, delivered before a national television audience on November 4, St. Charles' Day, de Gaulle implied or assumed he would run for reelection to "finish his task." Any alternative to his personal continuance in power, he explained, would send France back into the confusion from which he had twice rescued her already, this time without hope of redemption. The unqualified finality of this message (summed up by the *Canard Enchaîné*, as "*après moi, le chaos!*") not only destroyed any potential heirs but

served notice to the entire nation that its future was ebbing with the life of this aged and ailing specter whose infirmities had been cruelly accentuated by excessive television make-up which suggested the broken plaster of some deserted palace. Whatever shock the French needed to jolt them from their apathy had been provided, and the campaign, which had seemed so unreal and pointless, suddenly came to life. The act had prepared the way for the main action but toward a different dénouement than the one the General had planned.

The third act, then, opened with the formal campaign. Elections in France have a fixed legal duration and this one, which began three weeks before the first voting day, was to be marked by the innovation of official radio and television programs for the candidates. In a rotating schedule, each of the six candidates was allowed 15 to 30 minute "spots" on the state radio and television. All performances were taped, also on a fixed schedule (with the possibility of censorship acknowledged), the radio programs being run at noon and 7 p.m. and the television performances at 8:30 in the evening. Only the General was experienced with either medium for the simple reason that he had maintained a jealous monopoly of both since his return to power; and he announced that he would use little of his time.

Although the radio talks were usually better, television had by far the greater impact on the public. The utter novelty of free political discussion, if nothing else, made the programs irresistible. Restaurants were empty and theaters opened late; even Paris traffic dropped. And in the center of this unprecedented national attention, much the brightest thing was the smile of Jean Lecanuet. Mitterrand, in contrast, was visibly ill at ease.

Exactly what the effect of this would be, no one could say except that the long dormant passion of the French for politics had been galvanized in a way that could hardly serve the Gaullist cause. Disdaining the role of ordinary candidate, the General stood aloof waiting for a "frank and massive"

mandate by plebiscite. What he, and most others, failed to realize was that his past electoral triumphs had been won against no opponents and that much of his support had been "captive." His entourage was obviously becoming nervous; but, as it turned out, the decisive action was not taking place before the cameras.

Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, who had been dispatched to Moscow on a shameless shopping trip for Communist votes, returned with the public blessing of *Pravda* but little else; while in the cavernous Salle Villiers in the heart of the Red district of Marseilles, an overflowing crowd gave Mitterrand an ovation that left no doubt that the French Communists were still reading *l'Humanité*. With the Communists standing firm, he could hardly get less than 30 per cent of the votes. Simultaneously, there was an even more surprising development in Alsace, where the assembled leaders of the M.R.P. declared for Lecanuet. Even though this was his own party, the move was as significant as it was unexpected. The East had always been de Gaulle's main bastion, supporting him with unswerving devotion; but it had now become even more passionately committed to Europe. When Pierre Pflimlin, the political heir of Robert Schuman, tried and failed to win concessions from de Gaulle, he raised the flag of Europe in revolt.

Lecanuet responded with a lightning "invasion" the weekend preceding the first ballot. From Mulhouse to Colmar, Strasbourg, Metz, and Nancy, he scored an unbroken and mounting triumph. In the "capital of Europe," Lecanuet himself was transformed by the fervor of the 7,000 *Strasbourgeois* packed in the Salle Wecken. His hitherto wistful references to the martyred American President John F. Kennedy, with whom he hoped to be identified, took on assurance. (He seemed oblivious of Kennedy's patrician origins and political inheritance, so different from his own.) But the question remained, how far and fast could the rebellion spread? As Lecanuet flew out of Nancy in a tiny private plane (in weather that threatened the

lives of all on board) he had put de Gaulle in ballotage, but he was seeing himself in the Elysée.

THE FIRST BALLOT

The battle of the first ballot, which should have concluded the third act and the play, now became the opening scene of a new fourth act. The omens of the pollsters were mixed. The government's experts claimed 55 per cent for the General: *l'Express* gave him only a 50-50 chance, but hardly anyone dared add up the obvious figures. With the Communists holding firm, Mitterrand could hardly win less than 30 per cent of the total, and the three minor candidates were sure to account for another 5 or 10. This meant that if Lecanuet won much over 10 per cent, de Gaulle would not have the necessary 50 per cent for election and would have to face a run-off or withdraw.

As the results began to come in Sunday evening, the Gaullists realized that their preparations for victory celebrations had been premature. With only 45 per cent of the vote, de Gaulle had suffered a humiliating defeat; still, even though he had lost his bid for an overwhelming mandate by plebiscite, he was still the leading candidate by a safe margin.

With 32 per cent of the vote, Mitterand had won a moral victory; but Lecanuet, whose 16 per cent had turned the tide, was the loser. Convinced that the Communist taint would make it impossible for Mitterrand to win, Lecanuet seemed to believe that he alone could lead the opposition to victory. He realized, however, that his own showing was too weak to sustain his campaign claim that Mitterrand would be honor bound to withdraw to make way for him. He even admitted, off the record, that he stood to gain the most from a Mitterrand victory and the legislative elections which he had promised. Almost certainly Lecanuet would emerge as the leader of the new majority and the next prime minister; but even so he could not bring himself to withdraw and join the Communists behind a non-Communist to defeat de Gaulle and save Europe.

This was an intellectual rather than a moral failure. Lecanuet failed to realize what Mitterrand had discovered—that Communist voters were no longer a revolutionary threat and that the bulk of the Socialists would not back a Center coalition dominated by the conservatives. But even if he had, the choice was difficult. There was little reason to think Lecanuet could deliver all his votes to Mitterrand. If he tried and failed, he risked alienating many whose votes he hoped to win another time; but if he did nothing he risked his leadership of the new political force he seemed to have evoked.

The final act was played out on televisions screens and in meeting halls all over France. It was the traditional battle scene, but the liberating prince failed to dislodge the old King who sacrificed his honor for his throne. No one really expected de Gaulle to retire to Colombey rather than face ballotage, but few would have predicted the panic with which he fought or the tragic havoc he would wreak. Unleashing his minions in the provinces, he launched himself into a series of television interviews. The three minor candidates delivered their supporters to Mitterrand intact, but Lecanuet remained fixed by his false dilemma. The Communists campaigned furiously to recover the wayward 10 per cent of their forces that had defected to de Gaulle in the first engagement, but the decisive votes were obviously those abandoned by Lecanuet. Jean Monnet broke his lifelong principle of remaining outside politics to try to rally Lecanuet's supporters to Mitterrand and the cause of Europe: but in the end "communism" turned out to be a stronger argument than "Europe."

Ironically the Gaullists, hoping for further Communist defections, seldom used the issue in public; but it was the favorite weapon of their covert supporters. Those influenced by its threat were characteristically small employers, shopkeepers, tradesmen, farmers, for whom revolution was anathema and any raise of wages such as Mitterrand had promised was a mortal threat. Knowing fully that they were fighting for their lives, these anachronistic forces needed no exhortation

to save the day. De Gaulle himself ran against the Fourth Republic, while his faithful hacked away at the traitorous temerity of those who dared stand against their hero. In the one large Gaullist rally in Paris, Maurice Schumann ranted at the opposition as a conspiracy of assassins and André Malraux raved against their sacrilegious betrayal of their country's history while goon squads converged on any section of the hall where a heckler dared raise his voice. Indeed, perhaps the most striking single difference between the first and second phases of the campaign was the drop in tone when de Gaulle and the Gaullists entered the fray. During the first phase none of the candidates ever descended to personal abuse or mean insinuation of the General let alone one another. Without exception, they appealed to generous emotions and pleaded for a better world.

The Gaullists, in contrast, spewed out anger, malice and abuse; and the General, in his televised interviews, waxed garrulous, then ludicrous, and finally coarse when he compared the preceding regime to a family in which the father was a drunk, the son a delinquent, the daughter a tramp, and the mother a slattern—all this in vulgar slang. The camera actually turned away, as if in embarrassment, from the spectacle of the tragic figure of an old man literally bouncing on his chair with excitement over his performance.

THE SECOND BALLOT

When the votes were counted and the General had amassed the 55 per cent he had originally expected, it was widely held that his desperate descent into the arena had saved the day. In retrospect, however, it seems probable his sacrifice was both unnecessary and ineffectual. The logic of the electoral arithmetic was as favorable to him in the second vote as it had been unfavorable in the first. Mitterrand, who had alternated between marathon sessions in the studio struggling to improve his television style, and lightning dashes into the provinces, fought without any hope of immediate victory, but in preparation for the "third ballot"—the

legislative elections due in the spring of 1967. That the Gaullists would be able to perpetuate their hold on the assembly seemed unthinkable, and that even de Gaulle could hold out indefinitely against a determined majority in the Palais Bourbon seemed unlikely. In the meantime, his loss of a real majority in the country deprived him of his favorite weapon: the referendum. No longer able to circumvent the assembly or impose his will by this device, it was not clear what he could do. But that is the subject of the epilogue which still remains to be written.

What must be considered, however, is the moral of the play. What did it reveal about the French? What does it portend for their future? An analysis of the electorate by categories: age, sex, normal political affiliation, amount of education, revealed a regular pattern. In any group, more women voted for de Gaulle than men; but in every group, support of de Gaulle increased with age and decreased with education. In addition, the campaign showed that the large majority of labor, peasant, and business organizations, together with the bulk of the serious press, opposed de Gaulle. Everyone, it seemed, "except the voters," was against de Gaulle, but time and progress appeared to be clearly on the side of the opposition.

Mitterrand, moreover, had obviously read the lesson of the 1962 election; he knew that a popular front was operating in spite of the denials and denunciations of leading politicians. He also understood that it was no longer necessary or possible to "keep the Communist voters in a political ghetto." And the delightfully absurd spectacle of Waldeck Rochet and Guy Mollet, locked in a fraternal embrace and metaphorically waltzing through the campaign without missing a measure, demonstrated that these seasoned infighters were also learning that the Left in France was no longer what it used to be. If de Gaulle had retired after the first round, would Mitterrand have been able to defeat Le canuet? It is not possible to say with certainty, but it seems unlikely, although some votes would have been switched. Even if

the unified Left is the largest and most dynamic force in French politics at the moment, it does not yet command a clear majority; and until it does, the entire Center and Right will tend to consolidate against it in a showdown (as they did on the second ballot).

The next question is: who were the 45 per cent who voted for de Gaulle on the first ballot, and where will they go when de Gaulle finally disappears? One identifiable group, typically veterans of Verdun and the widows of their comrades (and this general category still includes millions), voted for his legend, but they will die with him. Another segment of his support came from those who instinctively distrust politics and prefer administrative government (an old, established and *respectable* form in France). Less easy to characterize, they include the considerable body of highly trained bureaucrats who run the country, and the bright, ambitious young men who intend to succeed them. But few of the rest voted as much for de Gaulle as against the Left or the Fourth Republic.

AN UNAVENGED GHOST

In fact, our cast of characters should have included the unavenged ghost of the dead Republic. In every scene, de Gaulle and his courtiers invoked the spirit of their murdered victim, to frighten the weak or treat the bloodthirsty to a reenactment of the crime. But the perverse ghost wreaked its vengeance not on its tormentors but on those who had once failed to save its life and, later, failed to defend its honor. If it can make its curse stick, the French will not be able to breathe life into their next Republic until they lay this unhappy spirit to final rest. The French, that is, have fallen into the easy but dangerous psychological pitfall of evading their inadequacies by blaming their failures on an external agent, i.e., the constitution of the Fourth Republic.

Actually, the government of the Fourth Republic reflected the will of the country with unusual accuracy, and even though it will be argued that this very sensitivity produced the dreadful instability that often paralyzed the regime, it must be conceded

that the same regime deserves credit for avoiding revolution or coup d'état following the war, restoring the devastated areas, reorganizing French industry (through the plans), and laying the foundations of Europe. The test it failed was the Algerian war of independence, but that too may have been as much a failure of the French as of their institutions.

What the French will have to recognize before they will be able to reestablish a healthy constitutional republic is that the monetary inflation and governmental instability that marked the course of the Fourth Republic and are now recalled with such unalloyed revulsion actually saved France from probable disaster. Maintaining a stable franc by force might have spared the savings of the bourgeoisie; but it might also have driven the workers into the streets and France into a people's republic. Similarly a stable government would have had to be maintained by force and by sacrifice of the interests of specific groups. Instead, France entered the Fifth Republic with the economic base fully prepared for the prosperity for which de Gaulle now takes the credit and without having liquidated its "kulacks" or its proletariat.

The fundamental lesson, of course, is that the price of democratic government is the willing acceptance, from time to time, of rule by the opposition. Under the strain of postwar problems, it is possible that the opposition could not have been trusted. Mitter-

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According to this specialist, "A settlement of European problems promoted by the loosening of hierarchic alliances East and West, the inclusion of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in particular, functional agreements leading toward a secure, viable continental system—this was de Gaulle's grand design." Is there a more practical course for France and for Europe? French foreign policy utilizes "logic based on national interest and persistence born of decades of [de Gaulle's] national service. . . ."

French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle

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WHILE DE GAULLE'S MARGIN of victory in the campaign for the presidency was narrow enough to cheer his critics and possibly disappoint him, it was still substantial by Western, to say nothing of French, standards. That the outcome of the battle and, indeed, the fact there was a battle at all will chasten the imperious "guide" of the Fifth Republic, causing him to modify his basic policies, appears highly dubious. That there will be shifts in techniques and tactics can be taken for granted—after all, this is the man who started out to make Algeria French and then gave it to the Algerian Muslims; who devised the Community to keep African territories tied to him, only to let them go while people were still debating what the Community really meant. But before attempting to chart the possible directions and parameters of change, it would be prudent to remind ourselves of some of the very simple operating principles with which this remarkable general-president approaches the external world.

For de Gaulle the world is composed of sovereign states. They and they alone are the actors who set events in motion, for good or for ill. A "questioner" at the president's twelfth press conference remarked that "The opponents of this principle [of national independence] say that it is outdated," in reply

to which de Gaulle listed a "series of facts," beginning with "the accession to sovereignty of a large number of States that have been created or restored since the war and, simultaneously, the unfolding of their reciprocal quarrels." In concluding his address to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Maurice Couve de Murville, the only foreign minister the Fifth Republic has had, remarked,

Already the last world war is far behind us . . . the countless nations that have emerged are beginning to gain an awareness, all together, of their own originality. . . . Henceforth a world is being shaped in which the relations between States—all States—are once again assuming vital importance.

Such a world requires clear and firm leadership within states if it is to survive. National leadership is either forthright, with the chain of command clear, or it does not exist and the nation itself is endangered. Authority must be discharged responsibly and its possessors respected, whatever may be the quarrels of the moment.

Once he had suffered through the tragic June of 1940, de Gaulle insisted on the full authority to act in a crisis, a power granted him by article 16 of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. He contrasted French impotence with Dutch unity, retained because the Queen had left the country (as de Gaulle

did) with full sovereignty in her hands (which de Gaulle was continually to claim and clearly did not possess). For him the constitution of the United States was an admirable instrument because of the responsibility with which it endowed the American president.

France's political institutions must be so framed that its leader can array the resources of the country behind his policies to advance and protect French interests. While French power was clearly less than that of the continental colossi—the United States and the Soviet Union (and possibly China at some time in the future)—the lack of respect accorded France in the past was due to its failure to use its capacities constructively and effectively. Properly directed, France was a nation to be reckoned with; it belonged in the councils of the greatest; its destiny was to discharge to the full the worldwide responsibilities it retained, alone among European nations, responsibilities which could not be abandoned without danger to other sovereign states, as well as to itself.

The first paragraph of the first book of de Gaulle's war memoirs contains these words: "The positive side of my mind always assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France "without greatness."

Returned to power, de Gaulle never tired of striking the same note, often in the beginning of his speeches or press conferences: "France does not intend to lose its own personality." To establish general peace and concord among peoples, "that is the will, the task, in other words the policy of France."

The independence thus regained is enabling France to become, despite the ideologies and hegemonies of the colossi, for all the racial passions and prejudices, above and beyond the rivalries and ambitions of nations, a champion of cooperation. . . . France is, par excellence, qualified to act this way.

"There is much at stake," President de Gaulle told the women and men of France,

in announcing that he was prepared to lead them for another seven years,

France's position and [acts] in a world over which incalculable dangers are hovering . . . the consideration and heed of other peoples, deservedly won by us by upholding everywhere the cause of freedom . . . the entire world is watching you to discover whether you, by your vote, are going to ratify or to obliterate what we have achieved outside France, to support or to impede the progress we are making.

What has surprised and dismayed foreign and domestic opponents is the vigor and consistency with which de Gaulle translates his conceptions of France in the contemporary world into national policies. Yet the logic of his definition of leadership has long been apparent. Division of powers has no place in his scheme; sharing responsibility—with the government, as defined by the constitution of the Fifth Republic, with the legislature, with the courts—is dilution of responsibility. "The direction of France belongs to those who have been entrusted with it," de Gaulle told the people of Menton on one of his "get-acquainted" tours of the countryside. "Therefore, it belongs above all to me. I say this here and now, with no equivocation."

For de Gaulle periodic plebiscite was the best means of affirming presidential action, whether under emergency powers or under assumed mandate.

The system of government . . . is the system of the national majority, I mean, of that which emerges from the nation as a whole, expressing itself through its individual and sovereign mass. "It is above all with the people themselves that he who is their representative and guide keeps himself in direct contact. For in this way the nation can know the man who is at its head, discern the ties which unite it to him, be acquainted with his ideas, his acts, his plans, his concerns, his hopes."

The 1965 election was a disappointment, fundamentally not because of its outcome, but because it turned out to be an election, not another plebiscite. This time the old factions forced their way to the surface; the choice presented the people was not between two ways—the new and good or the old and bad—but among several, overlapping, confusing ways, of which de Gaulle's was only

one. Worse, his way narrowly escaped identification as the old and bad.

The president would have little difficulty in reaching conclusions from this near fiasco. They did not imply changes of course, but rather tacking for position. (This was, after all, the same man who maneuvered a defeat by the assembly for his Pompidou government into a victory for his presidential system; the same man who, having insisted on an absolute majority in a referendum on that system, decided to carry on after the voters refused him that majority.) The failure, if such it were, lay with incompetent advisers (shuffle the cabinet), with the inadequacy of institutions (strengthen rather than change them), above all with the historical suspicions and fancies of the French. As de Gaulle saw it, alone, they would fall prey to mischievous factionists, petty quarrels, idle dreams. Such was not their destiny, so long as the leader remained to call them to their stern duty. Not for de Gaulle to prepare the inevitable transition to lesser and weaker hands by reviving the organized political life he had tried so hard to destroy.

International affairs more closely conform to the Gaullist concept of unitary action and reaction than does French society. Beyond the frontiers of France, de Gaulle appears to operate with a surer grasp. If the world is made up of sovereign states, then its organization should be on that basis. France's view of the United Nations and Communist China has lately placed it in opposition to its allies and in uncomfortable proximity to its cold war antagonists, but the French view is the very essence of consistency. The United Nations is only its membership and nothing more. That individuals purporting to act in the name of the United Nations should take independent action is deplorable; that states correctly objecting to such behavior should be asked to pay for such acts is inadmissible.

I must state very frankly [Couve de Murville told the Assembly] that the French delegation, in contrast to many . . . firmly subscribes to the idea that it does not behoove the United Nations, in the present state of affairs and doubtless for a

long time, to leave the political sphere which eminently belongs to it and in which . . . experience shows it can be effective once it expresses itself on behalf of world public opinion with the support of the powers that themselves have the means for action. But resorting to force can be only an adventure . . . the addition of national contingents does not constitute an army. . . . It is unconceivable that such military operations would not result in deeply disuniting the nations we are.

Perhaps France cannot destroy the "peace-keeping" initiatives of the secretary-general, but it can win at least temporary victories on the issue of the charter's provision for financing them.

POWER AND AUTHORITY

In the *world* grouping of states, authority should lie where the power is—with the permanent members of the Security Council. And, reciprocally, the Security Council should have as permanent members those states having great power. To France, the case for seating China is as simple as it is compelling. Many Westerners should have been made uncomfortable by the simple clarity of the French presentation. Roger Seydoux, France's permanent representative to the United Nations, spoke to both the legal and the political points.

The People's Republic of China does not represent a power that is a candidate for admission to the United Nations; on the contrary, it represents a country, China, which is a member of our Organization and indeed one of the founding members. . . . We know that, until solutions are found to the principal problems dividing the world, discussions of this Organization with the presence of the representatives of China will often take an acrimonious turn. . . . But we also know that, until the arrival here of the representatives of China, many of those discussions will become more and more unreal and that, even if they are conducted calmly, they will not lead to any serious result.

"We are not concerned here with passing judgment on China's internal system, which is in no way within our competence," Couve de Murville told the General Assembly.

We are concerned with the United Nations itself, where the world's most populous nation should be able to make itself heard, as do dozens of States, large, small, and even very small, that

we have admitted since 1949 once we were told that they had acceded to independence and to sovereignty.

For France, the question was a procedural one, to be decided by majority vote. Unless the United States gets itself embroiled in direct, military conflict with China, it is only to be expected that France will adhere to its position and that *its* position, not that of the United States, will prevail.

EUROPEAN POLICY

In the *European* grouping, the ultimate verdict may at first glance appear in far greater doubt. Here, as in the United Nations, France is advancing a conception of inter-national organization as being just that—an organization among nations, meaning among sovereign states. But in Western Europe there is the Treaty of Rome, clearly envisaging the progressive development of extra-national units with broadening powers of decision in the hands of directing, non-political bodies. On this issue, France stands alone, opposed by the five Common Market partners. Dangerous isolation or humiliating capitulation seemed the unattractive alternatives after French representatives walked out of Common Market negotiations in the fall of 1965. Behind appearances, however, lay realities which went far toward making the French position neither irrational nor untenable.

The Gaullist plaint was threefold. The other members of the Community had not settled with France on a common agricultural policy, but still proposed to pretend that the development of the Market was taking place smoothly. Agriculture had stalled negotiations in other years. For France it represented the very essence of the Community arrangement—freeing internal restraints on trade while protecting national products against outside competitors. French agricultural interests represented a substantial bloc of votes which should not be thoughtlessly alienated. Precisely because the Fifth Republic was bent on shifting the balance of economic power toward large, progressive industry and was walking a financial tight-rope between inflation and deflation to do it,

French agriculturists should be presented with the sizeable, uncompetitive market of all the Six to reduce their frustration over internal constraints.

In June, 1965, however, much more was at stake than agriculture. The test had finally come of de Gaulle's thesis that European organization could only be built on *cooperation* among *sovereign* states. Unsuccessful in persuading his neighbors of this, he had at least derailed the train bound for Political Community, stopping with the all-but-meaningless Franco-German Treaty instead. The president had also used British unwillingness to accept either the complete regimen of the Common Market or the supranational system the other Common Market countries professed to want as supporting arguments for excluding Great Britain from a continental organization. Less than three years later, the French found supranationality raising its head again in the form of the clauses of the Rome treaty and the practices of the Common Market Commission. The clauses involved called for a shift from unanimous to majority votes when the stage advancing to the complete Economic Community—now being approached—was actually reached. The French believed that Walter Hallstein was leading the Commission toward a position of supranational authority over the behavior of member states.

Separated from the other leaders by the agricultural issue—to say nothing for the moment of military and Alliance policy—de Gaulle could not contemplate being outvoted and bound to the outcome. To him, decisions by the Commission seemed as political as they ever had been, if not more so. The Commission must be called to order, returned to the control of the Council of Ministers, on which all governments were represented, a Council acting only by consensus. In September, 1965, de Gaulle told his press conference that "nothing which is important at present in the organization and and later in the operation of the Common Market of the Six should be decided and, even more important, applied, except by the

responsible public authorities of the six States, that is, the Governments controlled by the Parliaments." Referring to the position of Great Britain, he argued now for British inclusion in the European organization at the appropriate time. The French leader also struck the familiar note of a "Europe" made whole once more. France's plan for organized cooperation among the States, evolving doubtless toward a confederation . . . alone could one day make possible the adherence of countries such as Britain or Spain, which, like ours, could in no way accept the loss of their sovereignty. It alone would make the future entente of all of Europe conceivable.

Four months later, France advanced "ten proposals" to cut the Commission down to size. To them was attached a "timetable," which suspiciously resembled an ultimatum. Actually, the heart of the French position lay in proposals one, four, and ten. The first bluntly stated, "the Commission should, before definitively adopting a proposal of special importance to the States as a whole, consult the Governments at the appropriate level." Presumably each government would decide what was of importance and what the appropriate level of consultation should be. Number four complained that the Commission, ignoring the Treaty of Rome, was prescribing to the governments, not just the goals to be attained with regard to Common Market provisions, but the detailed rules to follow as well. "Such practices," said France, "should . . . be abandoned." The tenth proposal sought to tighten Commission purse strings by inviting the governments to revise "the terms and conditions for control over the assumption, approval, and execution of Community expenditures."

Having made its points, France sought to accomplish another of its goals by making a matter of urgency the creation of one commission for all three communities.¹ Sought by other members as a big step toward political unity, France tried to use it to accomplish precisely the opposite, and to get rid of Hallstein to boot. According to the time-

table, the questions of voting and Commission powers were to be set by February, 1966. On April 18, a meeting was then to be held to nominate a new commission to preside over Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community, as well as the Common Market. With French demands accepted, the unified Commision's capacity for growth would be circumscribed, its political base resting on national states.

The other five faced a crucial and nasty choice; they could allow the Common Market stall to continue, as it had since June, or they could resume the advance, but now toward the Gaullist destination. The former was impossible to maintain for long. Proposals to the Geneva meeting on tariffs were long overdue. The Economic Community itself would begin to fall apart, just as the British had long hoped it would, and any chance of political integration would be lost, probably forever. On the other hand, if the advance could be resumed, so long as it was not a rapid advance toward the rear, events inside and outside France might be stimulated to alter the destination.

It was a hopeful sign that after the presidential election Gaullist emissaries showed a readiness to return to the bargaining table. If the others agreed to replace the present members of the Commission, concessions could perhaps be won on details of the relationship between Commission and Council, between Commission and governments. Agreements on agriculture had not been im-

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¹ The European Economic Community (Common Market), the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

As this author points out, ". . . with comparatively few resources France has made use of the concept of community at two levels to further its own national interests. Both exist above considerations of race, religion, national identity and ideology."

The French Community— Does It Exist?

By BRIAN WEINSTEIN
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THE ORIGINAL Franco-African *Communauté* established in 1958 by Title XII of the constitution of the Fifth French Republic is dead, and its institutional successors are weak. Nonetheless, an informal political relationship and close economic and cultural ties exist between France and most French-speaking independent states of Africa, and a larger, non-institutionalized, cultural group—embracing all countries in the world where French is an official or important language—is not without importance in world affairs.

In the 20 years since the end of World War II, there has been a series of complex organizations and institutions linking France and Africa. One reason for the complexity and subsequent lack of clarity about the nature of Franco-African relations was the attempt on the part of the French governments of the Fourth Republic and the early Fifth Republic to avoid giving independence to the colonies.

Many Frenchmen feared that without colonies France would lose its power, that it would become a country of 45 million people instead of a Grand Ensemble of over 100 million. Although any thought of independence was resisted (at the same time that the British were beginning to set tentative dates for the independence of their colonies), it was necessary for the French to come to terms with the pressures for change—the result of

promises made during World War II, the war in Indochina and then in Algeria, the demands of the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955, the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, the independence of Ghana, and the increasing danger of civil strife in France itself.

The changes France offered the colonies of black Africa amounted to freedom without independence. Africans were increasingly free to be Frenchmen in a Grand Ensemble without being given the independence to be Africans. The French Empire had become the French Union during the Fourth Republic, and many Africans became French citizens. African representatives to French legislative bodies helped make French laws, and local assemblies permitted some participation in colonial affairs. Changes under the *Loi Cadre* of June, 1956, gave the peoples of the colonies much more voice in their own destiny. In 1958, the French Union was transformed into the *Communauté* with the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle as president and the establishment of the Fifth Republic.

According to the proposed constitution of the Fifth Republic, the member states of a Franco-African Community were to have "autonomy" with the power to "administer themselves and manage their own affairs" (Article 77); but control over foreign affairs,

finances, and mineral resources would be the responsibility of the Community as a whole (Article 78). The institutions of the Community were organized so that France would maintain its control over it. The president was the president of France assisted by an executive council representative of all members but without more than an advisory role. A senate and a court of arbitration had a majority of French representatives.

THE 1958 REFERENDUM

Black African adults and metropolitan Frenchmen were given the choice in the referendum of September, 1958, of accepting or rejecting the new constitution and the Community which it was supposed to establish. Rejection would mean independence, or "secession," as some Frenchmen called it. Article 86 indicated simply that a member of the Community could become independent but that it would then cease to belong to the organization. During his tour of Africa to build support for a "yes" vote, General de Gaulle emphasized that any country could choose independence by a negative vote but that independence would bring certain "consequences"—a cessation of aid programs, for example. Independence would, therefore, be punished.

When Guinea voted no, declared its independence, and requested association with that Community which all other territories had approved, the French government withdrew aid and personnel. A year after Ghana had become independent and had joined the British Commonwealth, France still rejected the idea of independence as an acceptable choice for one of its colonies.

Regardless of the French position, independence was inevitable, and when Mali decided it would declare its independence in 1960, an attempt to save the Community was made by altering the constitution. A law tacked on to the constitution recognized independence and association as compatible:

A member state of the Community may, also, by way of agreements, become independent without thereby ceasing to belong to the Community. [Constitutional Law, 4 June, 1960.]

This final recognition of independence as a legitimate choice for Africans came too late. Ivory Coast declared its independence before making any "agreements" with France as stipulated, and in the course of 1960 all former members became independent. French refusal to recognize independence before 1960 had destroyed the possibility of an institutionalized grouping of French and African states.

The *Communauté* was never officially dissolved, although its institutions no longer function. Some Frenchmen and Africans have chosen to believe it still exists. Attached to the office of the French president is, for example, a secretariat for the Community and African-Malagasy affairs. Troops under French command sent to Gabon in February, 1964, to crush a coup d'état were called "the Army of the Community" by the Gabonese chief-of-state. Most French newspapers referred to them simply as French troops (which they were).

France has not formally been a member of organizations which have succeeded the Community, but it is clear that French support is important for their survival. After the rather loose Brazzaville group, the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (U.A.M.) was the first of these. Its successor, the *Union Africaine et Malgache pour la Coopération Economique* (U.A.M.C.E.) transformed itself in 1965 into the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (O.C.A.M.) which all members of the former Community joined, with the exception of Mali. Congo (Leopoldville) became a member, but Mauritania resigned while its president was O.C.A.M.'s titular head. Other members have threatened withdrawal.

All these organizations have been criticized since 1960 as barriers to African unity and as neo-colonialist enterprises by means of which France is reputed to continue to control the destinies of former colonies. More important than these organizations in maintaining French influence are the frequent informal meetings in Paris between African presidents and President de Gaulle, meetings with the French minister of cooperation, the presence

of French technical advisors in many African ministries, French control over the Franc Zone (to which most countries belong), and the importance of France as a trading partner. French administrators, advisers and troops are returning to France, although a contingent still protects the president of Gabon and highly mobile units will be stationed at three African bases.

PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT

In 21 of the 36 independent countries of Africa French is at least one of the official languages. The total population of these francophonic countries is between 90 and 100 million. Belgium ruled in three—Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda and Burundi. Algeria was a part of France; the French ministry of foreign affairs had charge of the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and the "rue Oudinot" (the ministry for overseas France) governed the 15 colonies of black Africa and Madagascar.

These 15 which, with the exception of Guinea, voted for the Community, have a total population of about 45 million, or 10 million less than one former British colony, Nigeria. Underpopulation, the absence of a national tradition, and their close ties with France differentiate these countries from the rest of Africa. Their most important problems are unity and legitimacy, identity and self-confidence, and meaningful change.

Each country must make the nation-state the supreme loyalty group for all citizens for whom, unfortunately, kinship-type groups are still more important. Leaders must also prove they hold power legitimately. They use a single party and a single official ideology to solve these problems.

Several ruling parties arose out of the supra-territorial *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, founded in 1946 in Bamako by the young radical leaders. This was true of the ruling parties in Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Gabon, Chad and Congo (Brazzaville), whose leaders had known each other for many years. After the assassination of the president of Togo in January, 1963, a series of coups and

attempted coups began. This instability has shown that current political systems and parties are still not considered legitimate.

The need for unity at some high level is clear, but no one has successfully united two francophonic countries, much less all of them. In 1959, the two colonial federations of francophonic countries, *Afrique Occidentale Française* and *Afrique Equatoriale Française* dissolved themselves, and the forces in Africa and in France that favored territorial autonomy and, eventually, independence won over forces which favored unity. Certain regional organizations with limited membership and little power do exist, and new organizations attempt to solve common problems. (All francophonic countries belong to the Organization of African Unity [O.A.U.] but regard the regional groups as more in line with their interests.) Since 1959, the *Conseil de l'Entente*, with Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta, has coordinated the foreign policies of these four states. The *Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale*, which began its official existence on January 1, 1966, coordinates economic policies and is expected to set up a free trade zone among Gabon, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Congo (Brazzaville). Several other specialized multilateral organizations like *Air Afrique*, the airline company, operate to meet specific needs. The more important the organization the greater are the chances its office will be in Paris.

Educated black Africans in the French Empire became black Frenchmen. Prohibitions on the study of African languages and English, the possibility of French citizenship, participation in French politics, limitations on contacts with Britain and the United States and a sincere French belief in the superiority and universality of French culture oriented Africans towards France, and led many to despise African culture. According to the National Anthem of independent Cameroon (my translation):

O Cameroon. Thou Cradle of our Fathers,
Formerly, you lived in barbarism;
Like the sun you begin to appear
Little by little you emerge from savagery.

Civic education manuals in Cameroon stress the theme of becoming "civilized," and this usually means becoming French.

As a result, Africans have a problem of identity and a lack of self-confidence in their abilities as independent people. Too many Africans passively wait for direction and refuse to attempt innovation because they doubt their own abilities. The result is often a distressing tendency to copy European ways and institutions even in countries which call themselves revolutionary. Attempts on the part of some African educators to adapt educational programs to fit local needs have been less successful in French-speaking than in English-speaking countries. Changes are resisted by some leaders who have been educated in France and by some students who fear that any deviation from the French pattern will mean an inferior program.

MEANINGFUL CHANGE

"There is no gasoline; is this the meaning of independence?" "A tyrant rules our land; is this the meaning of independence?" The masses who ask these questions wonder if independence has really brought improvement. Frantz Fanon, and others, have written that black faces have merely taken the place of white faces, and that this African bourgeoisie, linked with expatriate interests and international trusts, seeks only self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement at the expense of the masses. He says that meaningful change can come about only through a violent peasant revolution which will sweep everything away.¹ This is an increasingly tempting solution for many African intellectuals.

One or two African leaders faced with the threat of violent revolution use methods reminiscent of colonial times and sometimes even similar to those used by the Republic of South Africa. At the same time, the gulf grows between a new class of civil servants and the masses, and there is a critical need for dedicated, trained middle-level functionaries to

translate rhetoric and often vague directives into action. National schools of administration have been established in almost all states to prepare these cadres, and students grow in numbers everywhere, but the type of education they receive is not necessarily related to their needs. A double economy still continues; private foreign-owned mineral extraction enterprises and a European-oriented economy exist as enclaves within the more traditional agriculturally-oriented economy. Even though industrial concerns hire Africans, mechanization is emphasized, and a higher percentage of management and technical positions are filled by Europeans in the former French territories than in neighboring English-speaking countries. Even secretarial positions are filled by wives of the Europeans who live, more or less permanently, in these countries.

Manufacturing has begun but factories are limited, investors say, by the fact that small countries have small markets, poor systems of communication and an inadequate labor force. Considerable economic progress has taken place in the Ivory Coast and a little in Gabon; both countries have favorable balances of trade and are developing their considerable resources. Many other countries are very dependent on outside assistance and are threatened with great unemployment and, possibly, food shortages as the rate of urbanization continues and agricultural production decreases in some areas.

The failure of some governments to solve real problems and of one or two leaders to recognize their duties to the nation, plus destructive corruption, have weakened Africans' faith in the promises of independence and have encouraged the military to seize power. Absence of meaningful change encourages cynicism and the withdrawal of intellectuals from political involvement; it also gives further strength to those who believe in the Chinese type of Communist revolution. Attempts to bring about meaningful change and progress have been sincerely undertaken in most countries, but the problems are far more complex than anyone realized. These problems must ultimately be solved by Afri-

¹ Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (Maspero: Paris, 1961). A translation has been published as *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965).

cans, but programs of assistance from France are playing an important role.

FRENCH ASSISTANCE

Nowhere does there seem to have been a greater effort to convince the average person of the necessity of aid programs for Africa than in France. French programs have been comparatively large. France has contributed more than 1 per cent of its Gross National Product to African assistance while the United States has contributed less than 1 per cent in nonmilitary assistance. (In terms of total dollars spent each year the United States has had a much larger program, of course.) The total French bilateral aid to black Africa has decreased from almost \$1 billion in 1961 to less than \$500 million, but some multilateral programs have increased, and the type of aid is changing.

The government has tried to convince all citizens of the need for a large aid effort. Polls have been taken to prove that most Frenchmen really favor assistance to Africa, particularly to former French colonies. The president emphasizes the need for such programs in his public addresses, and fairly objective studies show the effects of aid. The 1963 Clay Report on American foreign aid was a mere 25 pages long. The two-volume Jeanneney Report submitted to the French government in the same year was 100 pages long with almost 300 pages of specialized studies of the needs of developing nations and the role of France.² The French Economic and Social Council, an advisory body, has undertaken numerous studies of specific French aid efforts and the general assistance program. Its most recent study showed how complex the organization of French assistance is.³

Ministries which had colonial responsibilities have taken over aid programs. A new

ministry of cooperation is in charge of assistance to those countries once under the ministry for Overseas France and controls certain agencies which used to be attached to the "rue Oudinot." The ministry of foreign affairs holds responsibility for projects in Morocco, Tunisia and Guinea. It also supervises bilateral programs with all other countries. It sends teachers and technicians, grants scholarships, and manages cultural centers. Activities of the ministry of foreign affairs come into conflict with other ministries such as the ministry of cooperation in former Belgian territories like Congo (Leopoldville) where French influence is increasing. A special secretariat attached to the office of the premier supervises relations with Algeria, still considered as different from all other African states.

The ministry of finances plays a key role through its *Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique*. The *Caisse* could coordinate all aid efforts because it disburses money for other ministries such as the ministry of cooperation. It can also lend money on its own for purposes of investment and has been in charge of disbursement of the important subsidies granted to maintain a high price for African crops like coffee and cotton. The Common Market has undertaken to subsidize these crops. Other ministries—like the ministry of education which controls universities in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville) and Madagascar—have very specific and more limited functions.

"COOPERATION"

The government prefers to aid former colonies in Africa instead of aiding other countries and increasingly emphasizes education. The terms used to explain this double emphasis are "cooperation" and "defense." The word "cooperation" refers to all those relations and projects between France and materially underdeveloped nations which contribute to the further development of the latter. The emphasis, the French say, is on mutual respect and mutual aid. Cooperation and the ministry of cooperation are, the

² "The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance," Washington, Department of State, 1963. *La Politique de coopération avec les pays en voie de développement*, Paris, Ministère d'Etat, Chargé de la Réforme Administrative, 1963.

³ Robert Aubé, "La Coopération française dans ses mécanismes d'intervention," *Conseil Économique et Social, Journal Officiel*, 11 April, 1965.

French insist, above every-day politics and the vicissitudes of international relations. According to the Jeanneney Report, a key justification for it is a sense of human solidarity. "Cooperation" most often describes relations between France and the former members of the Community, while "technical assistance" and other terms describe aid programs to other countries.

It is necessary, French leaders say, to make an "*effort particulier*" in the francophonic countries of black Africa and Madagascar because of their historical ties with France, the friendship which prevails, the absence of language problems and the relative proximity of the countries.⁴ The money for this "*effort particulier*" comes from the *Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération* (F.A.C.) of the ministry of cooperation. It supports research, teachers, French technicians and administrators, scholarships, training programs in France and in Africa, economic planning projects, and the activities of several public and semi-public agencies. F.A.C. used to subsidize the annual budgets of most members of the Community, but its role in this area has been substantially reduced. It has also decreased the total number of French administrators or *conseillers techniques* who, in the first years of independence, were more important than the African ministers themselves.

Decreases in personnel and in money spent by the ministry of cooperation indicate a change in the orientation of cooperation. In spite of the fact that the total French personnel in Africa has decreased, the number of teachers, and scholarship and training programs have increased. Teachers in Africa under the ministry of cooperation have doubled since 1960 and, counting the contributions of all ministries, there are almost 10,000 French teachers in the 14 states of the old Community. Another 10,000 teachers

are in Algeria, and about 14,000 have been sent by the ministry of foreign affairs all over the world.⁵

All 14 members of the former Community signed the Yaoundé Convention of July, 1963, and thereby agreed to continue an association with the Common Market which had begun five years earlier, before independence. (Four other African states—Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia—also signed.) A free trade area between the six European countries and Africa insures a market for African products (as well as European products), and between 1963 and 1968 the Common Market's European Development Fund is supposed to spend \$800 million in aid to these 18 Associated States. France has pledged almost one-third of this fund and has considerable influence over the ways the money is used in these former colonial outposts in Africa.

BILATERAL PROGRAMS

In spite of France's participation in a multilateral program of assistance through the Common Market, it has had strong preferences for bilateral programs. Only about one-fortieth of all aid to underdeveloped countries goes through international organizations, compared with about one-seventeenth for the United States.⁶ The French premier has explained why this is so: "The fundamental reason for keeping a bilateral aid program is our effort with regard to the French language."⁷

The French government believes that an indicator of French power is the number of countries where French is an important language and where French culture is highly esteemed. Bilateral programs and the Common Market, in which the French voice is loud and clear, can best promote the language and defend it where it is already spoken. French-speaking people will, the government believes, understand and support French policies; they will purchase French products; and they will be living testimony to the quality of Gallic culture which must be defended in those countries where old ties with France are threatened by the Soviet Union, China, and

⁴ Alain Plantey, "*Indépendance et coopération*," *Revue Juridique et Politique*, July–September, 1965, p. 330.

⁵ Aubé, *op. cit.* pp. 329, 334, 338.

⁶ Andre Lewin, "*Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et la Coopération Technique Multilatérale*," *Revue Juridique et Politique*, July–September, 1965, p. 458. The comparison is my calculation.

⁷ Cited by Aubé, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

the "Anglo-Saxons." To preserve the predominance of French the government, therefore, emphasizes aid to education. It also wishes to expand its influence into the anglophonic countries and into Latin America, but present programs are modest.

The United States has lately respected French desires for hegemony in the former Community, and American aid programs have actually decreased since 1962: "Ghana alone has received more U.S. aid than the combined total going to all 13 OCAM states."⁸ France remains suspicious of the United States, however, because of what is believed to have been the American role in the diminution of French influence in the Far East, North Africa and the Middle East.

A NEW COMMUNITY?

Close links between France and the former *Communauté* continue; clear French hegemony in these countries is a source of power for France and a source of aid for the Africans. In international organizations most of these countries add their votes to that of France, and French opinion has more weight. Uranium from Gabon helps build the French nuclear force, and other minerals like manganese, iron and aluminum, plus wood products, earn foreign exchange for the Franc Zone and satisfy some French needs.

Because of the expense to France, not all Frenchmen favor assistance. At the same time, many Africans desire more freedom to solve their problems utilizing the experience of countries other than France. Because the United States, when it limits aid programs, discourages this exercise in freedom, French-speaking Africans increasingly turn to the Soviet Union and China.

French language, culture and a certain shared history will continue to link France with these black African countries. Admiration for France remains important even in those countries whose political relations with the former colonial power are poor. Guinea, for example, has continued to send students in law and the arts and sciences to Paris, while

technicians are sent to the Soviet Union and the United States for training. In Senegal, where relations are good, President Léopold Senghor has said that even though the University of Dakar will become independent of French government control, it will remain a French language university in the French tradition because of the superiority of this language.

Another type of community exists between France and other countries, many of which have a French cultural tradition. The image of France under the leadership of General de Gaulle as a country independent of the United States attracts the support and admiration of the developing nations and of several European nations. The end of the war in Algeria, recognition of Communist China, development of an independent nuclear force, criticisms of American policies in Vietnam and even in Latin America have contributed to the image of France as a leader in world affairs.

Even though an independent France, caught like other nations between the superpowers, has only moderate power, France has served as an example to others and has permitted them more flexibility in international affairs by association with it. Several countries or areas are renewing old links with France. By increasing its ties with France as part of a *révolution tranquille*, Quebec Province, for example, is able to assert its autonomy in Canada: "In our own way, we are the representatives of French culture in North America, and we intend to fulfill the respons-

(Continued on page 244)

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⁸ Arnold Rivkin, "Lost Goals in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1965, p. 126.

As this economist sees it, French planning has become "a flexible formula for the forecasting and orientation of the country's economic and social development." Opinions vary as to the contribution that economic plans have made to France's current prosperity.

The French Planning Experiment

By VACLAV E. MARES

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WITH THE START of 1966, France launched her fifth development plan and entered her twentieth year of economic planning. December, 1965, was not only the last month of the fourth plan, but it also was the month of the French presidential election. This event offered an opportunity for a public review of economic accomplishments under the Fifth Republic (see appendix A). With proper allowance for campaign oratory, the statistical evidence of the expansion of France's economy and of the growth of her prosperity since mid-century is truly impressive.

France's gross national product rose from \$20.4 billion in 1950 to \$88.1 billion in 1964. This was partly the result of the upward movement of prices; the gain in volume of the gross national product (GNP) between the two indicated years was about 80 per cent. The volume of industrial production in the 1948-1965 period more than trebled. The production of iron ore doubled, that of steel trebled, that of bauxite and potassium quadrupled. The output of aluminum since mid-century multiplied five times, that of

motor vehicles six times, that of tractors thirty times.¹ The traditional budget deficits, ranging from one half to one billion dollars per year, disappeared, and the budget for 1965 showed even a slight surplus.² While the public domestic indebtedness grew in connection with the government's annual budget deficits, in the last 15 years France was able to cut her foreign indebtedness in half. Before the war, France's imports used to be covered by exports only to the extent of about 66 per cent. This prewar pattern of foreign trade continued in the early postwar reconstruction years, but it started to change in the 1950's and it has varied between 80 and 110 per cent during the past ten years. (See appendix E.) France's official monetary reserves increased from \$645 million at the end of 1957 to more than \$6 billion at the end of 1965.

Equally favorable data indicate substantial improvements in the French living standard. The index of the hourly wage rates moved up from 100 to 213.4 in the 1953-1963 decade; since the consumer price index based on 1953 increased in the same period to 151.6, the real hourly wages in those ten years rose by 40.8 per cent. At the same time, per capita consumer expenditures in France were among the highest in Europe. At a level of \$990 in 1962, they were the highest in the Common Market group and the fourth highest—after Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark—in

¹ See *Economic Survey of Europe, 1964* (Geneva: U.N., 1964); Fourastié-Monet, *L'économie française dans le monde* (Paris: Presses universitaire de France, 7e édition, 1965); *France 1965*, one of the periodic reports of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) in Paris.

² See *Projet de la loi de finances pour 1965* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1964).

all of Western Europe. The share of consumer expenditures for food, beverages, tobacco and clothing dropped from 60.2 to 51.7 per cent between 1950 and 1962, which gave the French people an opportunity to use a bigger share of their incomes—relatively and absolutely bigger—for long-neglected housing, home equipment and travel. In the 1950–1962 period, the number of radio sets in use more than doubled and the number of television sets in use multiplied several hundred times; it is estimated that on a per capita basis in France there is in use one radio set per three and one television set per eight inhabitants. Of all European countries, in 1963, France had the highest number of registered passenger cars (7,800,000); she was second in the number of cars per thousand inhabitants (163, preceded by Sweden with 204). Even many of the French bicyclists have obviously benefited by this wave of growing prosperity and switched to an easier mode of transportation: the number of registered motorcycles increased from 817,000 in 1950 to 4,990,000 in 1962. A less enviable by-product of this rising affluence of the French people can be found in the statistics of the European consumption of alcoholic beverages. In terms of pure alcohol equivalent per capita, French people now consume the most. While this is partly due to the relatively harmless high consumption of wines, even in the per capita consumption of liquor France, together with Sweden and Germany, is at the top of the list.³

THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS

The French planning idea was not a product of some ideology, as is the case of economic planning in totalitarian countries; on

³ See *A Statistical Handbook of the North Atlantic Area* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1965).

⁴ The French planning system was well explained and officially evaluated in the publication *France and Economic Planning*, issued by the French Information Service in 1963.

⁵ These are all establishments and firms producing primary energy (coal, gas, hydroelectricity, atomic energy—but not oil refineries), all railroads, all scheduled airlines, plus some individual operations such as the Renault Automobile Works or the Aéroport of Paris.

the contrary, it developed shortly after the war out of the application of experimental methods to speed up economic growth. Unlike the imperative planning of the Communist countries, French planning became a flexible formula for the forecasting and orientation of the country's economic and social development.⁴ The first three plans used to be called "indicative," and the "voluntarist" principle had often been stressed. Under the fourth and in the preparation of the fifth plan—and especially in the stabilization plan—the government of the Fifth Republic showed a much stronger determination to supervise the execution of the respective blueprints so that they were more frequently referred to as examples of "active" governmental planning. If, without apparent coercion, the expansion of the French economy followed in the main lines the ideas of the plans, this can be ascribed to several factors which helped to assure success.

What are these factors? First, the French government directly controls the operation of all nationalized enterprises.⁵ Second, it also controls all social investments for collective needs, which have continued to increased rapidly. In 1962, these two categories accounted for 35.5 per cent of all investments in France (compared with 18 per cent in the United States). Third, the government developed an extensive support program for its farmers who, in order to become eligible for it, had to consolidate their holdings and fulfill certain modernization requirements. Finally, multiple subsidies and low-cost loans were offered to those family and corporate enterprises which were willing to use them in accordance with the objectives of the plans. Both of these latter programs helped the government to exercise extensive indirect controls over the pattern of investments in the private sector of the economy.

Six basic industrial sectors were selected as target areas for France's first development plan (better known by the name of its author and main promoter as the Monnet Plan): coal, electricity, steel, cement, farm machinery and transportation. This was to be the foundation of France's future investment pro-

gram in all branches of her economy. France's economic stagnation in the 1918-1938 period, when the French industrial production index moved only from 100 to 105—and this due only to increased production of consumer goods—was to a great extent the cause of the French military collapse in 1940.

Given the condition of the French economy at the end of World War II, the task of the Monnet Plan was grandiose. It soon encountered considerable difficulties, but the economic aid of the Marshall Plan arrived at the right time to help attain the Monnet Plan's objectives. When, in 1953, the two plans ended, vital sectors of the French industry had overtaken arrears of more than 30 years. The second plan, which followed in 1954, was extended to cover all productive activities including agriculture, the processing industries, housing construction, and the development of production facilities overseas. Furthermore, the second plan emphasized quality and the cost of production by stressing the development of scientific and technical research, the training of labor, and market organization.

The third plan was characterized by the desire to steer a previously self-centered economy toward the Common Market and to prepare new job opportunities, first, for the increasing number of young people approaching working age and, later, for refugees from North Africa. While an unexpected recession at the end of the 1950's slowed down the growth of national production, the devaluation of the franc and the strengthening of France's financial situation created conditions for a quick recovery. When the third plan ended in 1961, the economy had regained its equilibrium and was on the average only about six months behind the plan's production goals. On the whole, the French economy succeeded in maintaining over the entire 1949-1961 period an average annual rate of growth of 4.5 per cent.

With the fourth plan covering the period 1962-1965, the government decided to escalate the growth of the economy, and set as the target for its annual growth the rate of 5.5 per cent. At the beginning all seemed to go

well. Overall statistical returns were in line with the plan's expectations. However, the upward trend of the consumer price index soon became disturbing. These were its annual increases in per cent against the preceding year: 1959, 6.1 per cent; 1960, 3.6 per cent; 1961, 3.3 per cent; 1962, 4.8 per cent; 1963, 4.8 per cent; 1964, 3.2 per cent; 1965, 1.9 per cent. The increase by 12 per cent in the first three years of this period was relatively mild in view of the fact that it was preceded by the devaluation of the franc by 17.5 per cent. The increase by 14.7 per cent in the following four years coinciding with the years of the fourth plan could not be justified by any devaluation of the franc; it was purely inflationary.

THE STABILIZATION PLAN

While the workers' earnings were rising even faster than the consumer price index, their output per hour was rising much more slowly, which pushed the unit costs of manufacturing up. This, in turn, adversely affected the competitiveness of French products in foreign markets. From figures showing the use of the gross national product it became evident that both the private and the public demand for goods and services had expanded much more quickly than had been anticipated and that consumption had encroached upon investment. In 1963, the volume of retail sales increased by 9 per cent, the number of issued authorizations for residential construction by 23 per cent. Sales of many durable goods showed still higher increases. Also disturbing was the newly widening gap between France's exports and imports especially in view of the fact that it was caused mainly by mounting imports of consumer goods. The surplus of the current account of France's balance of payments was further reduced by the spreading popularity of travel abroad. Increased personal incomes and extended paid vacation privileges offered this opportunity to many French families for the first time; as a result, the traditional income from tourism in France's foreign exchange accounts was wiped out almost completely.

These alarming trends prompted the French government to launch its stabilization plan in September, 1963. It was not intended as a substitute for the fourth development plan, which had been in operation only 20 months. It was presented as a short-term, defensive action of the government in support of the fourth plan. Its rationale was to bring under control inflationary forces before they could spread throughout the economy and generate an overall wage-price spiral and general excess demand which would defy control unless the rate of economic growth were drastically reduced. The threat was believed to be real in the context of speculative attitudes, labor shortages and abundant liquidity which was supported by a continuing foreign capital inflow and increasing budget deficits.⁶

Rather drastic price-freeze provisions and fiscal arrangements were established subjecting appreciations of building land values to a special levy. Various measures were passed concerning credit; savings were encouraged. Thus, the stabilization plan succeeded in reducing, yet not eliminating, inflationary pressure on prices. Consumption by households slowed down. From 1963 to 1964, annual governmental expenditures rose by only 6.7 per cent, whereas receipts increased by 13.3 per cent. The increase in imports was brought under control and some credit figures appeared again in the monthly returns of foreign trade.

However, in the second half of 1964, the total economic activity started to level off. Industrial production declined and, at the beginning of 1965, the number of workers put on short-time was more than double, compared with the situation a year before. It seemed as if the French planners, with their deflationary measures and tight budget policy, had overshot the target and produced undesired results. This is why, in the course of 1965, they decided to relax the rigid price-freeze imposed on all manufactured products and to exempt those industrial groups which would "voluntarily" conclude so-called sta-

bility contracts with the government. Nineteen such contracts were concluded before the end of 1965, giving large groups of industries permission to raise the prices of some products on condition that they lower prices of other products.

In the last months of 1965, certain signs of revival started to appear in the monthly figures of output, of employment, of exports and in some other periodic reports, which the French planners interpreted as evidence of the end of the recession. Nevertheless they felt that, if they wanted to avoid further inflationary pressure on prices, they should reduce the rate of growth in the forthcoming fifth plan from the anticipated 5.5 per cent to 5 per cent. They adjusted the plan, reduced the rate of consumption growth to 3.5 per cent per year and set the annual target rates of growth for investments from 6 to 8 per cent, depending on the investment's category. Not all observers, however, shared the optimism of the French official spokesmen as to the maintenance of these rates for the rest of the 1960's.

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC'S ACHIEVEMENTS

Opinions differ also about the past contribution of the various plans to France's present prosperity. It would have been a greater miracle—the antiplanners argue—if, among other rapidly growing national economies, France's economy had not grown as it did. It may be, they say, that without planning the French economy would have grown even faster, as did the West German and the Italian economies. Some of the critics irreverently compare the self-confidence of the planners to that of the legendary cock who believed that his crowing caused the sun to rise. And others find that the French economy demonstrated its vitality by the fact that it succeeded to grow *in spite* of the planners' interference with its natural development.

Such comments of die-hard believers in the wisdom of laissez-faire economies are unfair. All postwar governments contributed to the rejuvenation of France's sclerotic structure—the main cause of her stagnation in the interwar period. The critics also overlook the

⁶ See *France 1965*.

fact that the spectacular recovery and growth of other European economies were also the result of well-planned policies. In France, the first, the second, and the third plan did not arouse much public attention; they served mainly as investment budgets and frameworks for the operation of certain governmental agencies and nationalized industries. Only the fourth and the fifth plans, both of which had been conceived and launched by the new team of technocrats of the Fifth Republic, were interpreted in official speeches as "symbols of France's future grandeur" and developed into a myth in which the public was urged to believe "with feelings of passionate obligation." Such public exhortations sometimes sounded like those on the radios of people's democracies or in various press releases from behind the Iron Curtain. With only rare references to such men as Jean Monnet, Paul Ramadier, or Antoine Pinay, the public eulogies often did not correctly evaluate all factors and policies which had paved the way to France's present prosperity. On the other hand, it would be unfair to minimize the present regime's contributions to it.

The Fifth Republic's regime can claim credit in particular for:

(a) its determined effort to revitalize certain backward provinces (such as Brittany, Auvergne, Aquitaine and Languedoc) and to give to each of them a role in the development of the modern French economy. Where new industry was wanted, the government offered subsidies as high as 20 per cent of the capital to be invested. These support actions in the designated "conversion areas" were coordinated with measures correcting occupational imbalances in other areas, as in coal mining and ship-building districts, or in regions where most of the people depended on a single employer (for example, big aircraft or automobile plants);

(b) a reform of agricultural structures for which the framework was set by a body of legislation enacted between 1960 and 1962⁷ and which aimed at the consolidation and

modernization of farm holdings; the orientation of production in accordance with national needs and with foreign demand prospects, in order to assure the farmers higher incomes; the reorganization of agricultural education at all levels in order to establish equality in educational opportunities and, in this way, economic and social parity among the urban and the rural sectors of the population;

(c) a reform of the distribution channels which were too dispersed at the retail level, too centralized at the wholesale level, and had too many middlemen for certain products (such as meat). This policy started with some radical changes in the structure of the central markets. In the Paris region, it consisted of the creation of two new large markets, one for fruits and vegetables, the other for meat, and in the moving of les Halles, the old Paris market and tourists' attraction, to the outskirts of the capital. In other parts of the country, the decentralization plan aimed at creating 27 new regional market centers. Other measures such as food standardization, quality control, and the creation of producers' groupings are under way.

By protecting the planners in their reorganization efforts and by defying the charges that they were socializing the French economy, the government of the Fifth Republic made its most valuable contribution to France's economic revival. By its support of the young, progressive elements in the professional trade organizations, such as the manufacturers' *Patronat* or the landowners' *Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitation agricoles*, the government helped to break their monopolistic power and their traditional resistance to change in the name of the sanctity of all their *droits acquis*. Without de Gaulle's authority this conflict of interests would have been as difficult to settle as the conflict in Algeria.

The Fifth Republic's reforms accelerated certain changes in production and employment, accentuating trends which were noticeable earlier. The percentage of the labor force employed on farms dropped to less than 20 per cent in the mid-1960's and the per-

⁷ See this author's article, "The French New Deal," in *Current History*, November, 1963.

centage of the labor force earning its living as individual shop owners, self-employed, and unpaid family workers dropped to 27 per cent.⁸ The needs of modern technology and the popularity of the new supermarkets accelerated the process of liquidation of marginal family firms in production and distribution. Tax reforms, too, favored the trend towards concentration among French industrial and business enterprises.⁹ The present regime also succeeded in stimulating the lethargic residential construction industry by means of new financing facilities and by channeling personal savings to this use; it operates now at a rate of 1,000 new housing units completed every day, twice as many as ten years ago.

In the field of social policy, the Fifth Republic can claim that its new retraining programs and financial assistance to trainees has increased the mobility of the labor force. The French social security system was extended both in terms of eligibility and in terms of more generous benefits; the largest single group—some six million persons—

brought under the coverage of the system was the group of self-employed in the farm sector. The special feature of the system is the family allowance—a fixed amount for each child paid monthly to every French mother. In 1965, these payments amounted to about \$3 billion; they are the fastest growing benefits in the French social security system and are financed entirely by general budgetary appropriations.¹⁰

In the area of social policy, the present regime also claims some credit for the smooth transfer and absorption of the 850,000 repatriates from Algeria. It is, however, hard to believe that this action would have required special effort. It seems more likely that, had the repatriates not come in the early 1960's, the French economy would have had still greater labor shortage problems until 1964, when the stabilization plan helped to put at least a partial brake on the economy's expansion.

AND ONE MAJOR FAILURE

In one respect the official spokesmen for the regime had to admit that they did not attain their goal. The Achilles' heel of the French economy is the sluggish growth rate of private productive investment. When it was increasing at all—in some years the price increases counterbalanced the small increases in expenditures—it was concentrated almost entirely in a few sectors (mainly oil and construction), whereas in manufacturing it has dropped by about 5 per cent annually since 1963; in some industries, as in iron and steel, the decline has been much sharper. This is a rather discouraging experience for the planners. Year after year, reviewing the annual performance figures of the economy, they have announced some new action to remedy the situation, but none has been effective. The ominous significance of this failure—the lack of the private sector's confidence in the government's estimate of the country's growth—is not offset by the substantial increases of the total investment from one plan to another.¹¹ Such figures are misleading, first, because the actual investment expenditures of the French economy stayed behind

⁸ See *A Statistical Handbook of the North Atlantic Area*.

⁹ These structural changes helped, yet they were only the first step in the right direction. In the United States, 8.5 per cent of the labor force works on farms, compared with 19.6 in France. In the United States, 14.8 per cent of the active population is classified in the no-payroll group, compared with 27 per cent in France. Industrial concentration has proceeded in France much more slowly than in other European countries. According to 1964 sales figures, the largest two French companies—the *Shell Française*, and *Rénaul*t—ranked only eighteenth and nineteenth in the Common Market group where they were outranked in total sales figures by 12 German, 3 Dutch and 2 Italian corporations. Another example, which illustrates the same point, can be found in the classification of the world's largest steel producers according to the dollar value of their 1963 sales: among the 25 specified enterprises there is only one French company (*Schneider, Le Creuzot*), which ranks next to last in the group.

¹⁰ The effect of these family allowances upon the traditional pattern of husband-wife relationship became a research topic for sociologists. The recent increase of these allowances also increased the number of low-income, multiple-children families in which the mother controls a larger part of the family's spending money than the father.

¹¹ The third plan provided for average annual investments in the total value of \$1.62 billion; the fourth plan increased the figure to \$2.63 billion, and in the fifth plan the target figure is \$4.05 billion.

the planned figures for most of the years of the last decade; second, because the investment increases that materialized were the results of expansion in publicly-owned enterprises and in some private service trades, but not in privately-owned manufacturing establishments.¹²

A comparison of similar French and West German figures illustrates France's predicament in relation to her neighbor and traditional rival. In 1950, both countries had a nearly equal gross fixed capital formation—around \$5.7 billion per year (in constant 1962 dollars, residential construction excluded). Since then, this figure climbed in both countries, but much faster in Germany than in France. In 1962, the gross fixed capital formation amounted to \$17.5 billion in Germany against \$10.7 billion in France. Per employee the difference is still more striking: in the 1950–1962 period it increased from \$266 to \$649 in Germany and from \$300 to \$546 in France. The average annual ratio of gross fixed investment to GNP moved up as follows:

	1950/54	1960/62
in West Germany	19.4% of GNP	24.2% of GNP
in France	16.7% of GNP	19.7% of GNP

Thus, in France, in the early 1960's the fixed capital formation in relation to GNP attained the rate which it had been averaging in Germany ten years before. The annual increase of labor productivity in the French economy

¹² In the fourth plan (1962–1965), the following annual growth rates were

	planned	achieved
in productive investments	6.4	5.4%
in residential construction	5.7	6.5%
in social and other public investments	10.7	10.3%

In the private sector the gap between planned and achieved growth of productive investments was much larger than the above figures show; state-controlled investments in the nationalized industries and public enterprises helped to keep the gap relatively narrow. This latter group now accounts for about one-third, while the private sector accounts approximately for the other two-thirds of the total annual expenditures for productive investments.

¹³ See *A Statistical Handbook of the North Atlantic Area*.

¹⁴ See *France 1965*.

was also proportionally smaller than in Germany.¹³

The last governmental attempt to stem this trend was aimed at the organizational structure of banking and credit services. This reform is expected to divert into the capital market part of the personal savings which in the last years went into residential construction, and make them available for private productive investments. French businessmen believe, however, that the government will not succeed in stimulating private investments by new credit facilities. Far more than financing problems, they say, the reduced profit margins resulting from the government's drastic price control schemes are the cause of the low level of private productive investments. They predict that the French government will eventually be forced to recognize that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile a policy of long-term growth with a policy of controlled price stability.

Some international economists (like the authors of the 1965 O.E.C.D. Report¹⁴) show a similar yet otherwise motivated scepticism. They point to the limitations which France has to face both in her future labor supply and in her energy and other industrial resources (see appendix D). They doubt that, without again overheating her productive machinery, France can maintain an annual growth rate of 5 per cent until 1970, especially when her economy has also to satisfy such prestige re-

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"It is likely . . . that France's future course in the Common Market will be determined by countless extraneous issues, primarily by the role of the United States in Europe." In these words, this observer sums up French policy toward the Common Market.

France and the Common Market

By MARWAN JABRI
Writer on International Affairs

ON THE EVE of the Common Market's entry into its third and final stage of economic integration, France chose to boycott its activities. The specific issues over which she disagreed with her European partners were 1) whether a system of farm subsidies should extend over a period of five years or just two, and 2) whether major issues should be decided by the rule of unanimity or simply by a majority vote. France insisted on the longer period, as well as on the rule of unanimity, and walked out in July, 1965. In May, she had turned down an invitation to meet with her partners in Venice where a discussion of political integration was scheduled.

But beyond the complexities of determining voting procedures and settling agricultural subsidies, the Common Market was undergoing a dramatic recrudescence of nationalism. Ever since its establishment in 1957, and indeed during its formation, French nationalism has been an important factor limiting its paraeconomic effectiveness. Later, German counternationalism also became such a factor, presumably counterbalancing French obstructions. Yet nothing like the recent crisis ever shook the neat mosaic of postwar European *entente*, demonstrating the Common Market's structural vulnerability to the separatist tendencies inherent in European politics. At this point, the Common Market's future course, despite all the settlements and assurances, seems likely to remain uncertain as

long as the fundamental differences, not only among its members but also throughout Europe as a whole, have not been resolved with realism and determination.

Nevertheless, the Common Market, or the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) as it is formally known, remains the most significant achievement of postwar Europe. It has accomplished a great deal during the past eight years, and many economic applications can still derive from it with startling results. Though it has fallen short of its ultimate objective, European unity, it has nonetheless created among its members a strong and lasting bond unprecedented in the history of Europe. This alone is a monumental achievement. National tariffs on industrial products within the Common Market, already reduced to 20 per cent of their 1957 level, are scheduled to be eliminated altogether next year. Import quotas on internal trade have been abolished, while trade itself has increased by a remarkable 168 per cent since 1959.

In the area of labor and capital movement, considerable progress has been achieved. A comprehensive program of complete freedom of movement and establishment for national companies is almost a certainty. Even in the immediate area of the 1965 disagreement over agricultural policies, most issues had approached satisfactory settlement by the time France walked out. It is only in the area of national sovereignty that the Com-

mon Market seems partially to have failed, at least for the present.

For several months before France's walk-out, the Kennedy Round had been brought to a near standstill as a result of serious differences within the Common Market over agricultural policies. Some 60 countries throughout the world, participating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were affected by the delays in negotiations. In the background, there were elements of European economic protectionism, deficits in the United States balance of payments, French President Charles de Gaulle's demands for a return to gold as a reserve currency and similar important issues.

However, the Common Market's agricultural policies were scheduled for a full review in June, 1965; specifically, its farm subsidy system. Under this system, financial contributions were made by all six governments toward a common fund subsidizing the exporting countries' farmers, notably the French, against lower world prices and other aspects of tariff reductions. Those subsidies were automatically allocated to each country on an interim basis. But a deadline had been set, June 30, 1965, for substituting a more flexible policy governing the subsidy system, under which the Common Market's Executive Commission would ultimately have full control over the allocation of subsidies in each specific case. The immediate difference was that France insisted on extending the interim arrangement for five years; the others conceded only two.

But the real issue was not so simple. France had always opposed the growing authority of the Executive Commission, notably of its president, Walter Hallstein of Germany, and insisted that it be reduced. Here again, national sovereignty was at stake. The Executive Commission was increasingly becoming a supranational government for Europe. The proposed new farm policy would have given the Commission an independent budget and additional power and,

therefore, political characteristics. Similar considerations had already paralyzed proposals for a common energy policy. France's objections were not directed so much against a common farm policy or a common energy policy, as against its political implication, especially in the context of the Executive Commission's powers.

The conflict arose, however, when the Five¹ found in the situation an opportunity to force France into agreeing to further steps toward political integration. Since she stood to lose most from the collapse of the farm subsidy system, they felt confident that President de Gaulle would be willing to relax his position. On the other hand, though vitally interested in the subsidy system, France had an even greater stake in blocking, or at least postponing, political integration in Western Europe. Thus, instead of giving in, France boycotted the Common Market.

In normal circumstances, the agricultural, and even procedural, differences could have been settled without much controversy. But underneath France's boycott there were many crucial issues extending over a full range of commitments, not only in the Common Market but also in NATO, Western Europe and other vital areas. The unfortunate fact was that Western Europe, which gave the world the concepts of nationalism and internationalism, was too unpredictable as it stood on the threshold of determining its own position in relation to these forces.

France's boycott could not have been more conveniently timed. Her relations with West Germany, which had in the past induced many concessions in the name of *rapprochement*, were strained as a result of de Gaulle's attitude toward Germany's reunification and her participation in a European nuclear force. France's adjustment to the Common Market's increasingly industrial character was slow. The prospect of a procedural change in the Common Market in favor of a majority vote, depriving France of the power to veto whatever resolution she chose, was looming over de Gaulle's head. The economic integration of the Six was already a reality; its ultimate objective, poli-

¹ West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

tical integration, is considered by France a threat to her "national personality." By boycotting the Common Market, France hoped to force the Five to modify their economic and political courses as a price for her return to the organization.

That unhappy situation was neither accidental nor totally unexpected. Ever since de Gaulle's 1958 dramatic reappearance on the scene of world politics, France's ambitions have dictated that no concrete steps be taken toward political integration in Western Europe until she has had the opportunity to 1) develop an independent nuclear force, 2) reach an understanding with Eastern Europe as a basis for a full European reappraisal of the United States role on the continent, and 3) insure, by the previous two steps, that the proposed integration would fall within the scope of French leadership. Behind these French objectives there was a strong, almost Machiavellian determination to regain worldwide prestige.

The demarcation line between understanding General de Gaulle's policies—*vis à vis* traditional Western solidarity—and misunderstanding them is not always discernible. For they often seem to originate from extinct concepts of national supremacy and irrelevant guidelines in international relations. De Gaulle finds himself at the head of a nation whose major commitments had been ratified in his absence by a class of politicians whom he detested. Whenever possible, he has attempted to reinterpret France's obligations in such areas as the United Nations, NATO, SEATO and East-West relations. But in certain vital areas such as the Common Market, relations with Germany and other European questions, the French people's tangible interests have tended to be more deeply committed, and his obstructive policies thus have had greater influence leading to more substantial conflicts. He is more successful in applying his own political concepts and personal understanding of history to most international questions than to European issues.

In all fairness to de Gaulle, however, there has often been an element of compulsion in,

France's commitments. It has frequently happened that when a major commitment has been concluded by France, she had no governmental structure at all (as in the case of establishing the United Nations during World War II) or her government was too weak and divided to be firm. The Common Market, for example, was established when France was involved in fierce warfare in Algeria. At that time, any steps toward European unity and solidarity were welcomed by the shaky French government. The war was eating up France's resources, and the Common Market seemed like a bright solution to many of her economic problems.

When de Gaulle ended the war, France's need for the Common Market became less acute, although the French people had begun to discover in it a means toward additional prosperity. Yet the Common Market is not an end in itself but a means for achieving political unity among its members. It is, therefore, an economic phase toward a political goal. France, however, has seemed to recognize only one-half of its *raison d'être*. Although the Treaty of Rome under which the Common Market was established, never specified whether integration or cooperation was the ultimate objective, integration immediately outweighed cooperation in the minds of most Europeans, including Frenchmen.

An illogical situation then began to develop. On the one hand, the Common Market demonstrated its vital importance to all the members including France but, on the other hand, it failed to gain total and unreserved French support. Because of the need for French support, despite de Gaulle's negative policy and basic disinterest in the entire concept, France was able to dominate the Common Market, imposing her own points of view upon the more powerful nations such as West Germany. The reason for this anomaly was that General de Gaulle felt it his sacred duty to rid France of all commitments he considered unfair. To that end, he used every possible device at his disposal, including manipulation of such complex issues as Germany's reunification, the

multinational nuclear force, East-West relations, a French "role" in the Far East, another in the Middle East, ad infinitum. In short, he converted the Common Market—the only area where he was able to exert decisive influence—into a political arena for rectifying many of France's commitments. His hardened attitude toward Germany, for example, was originally the outcome of her insistence upon certain commitments to NATO and the United States, and not of differences within the Common Market itself.

REELECTION

Suddenly in December, 1965, something of monumental importance happened in France; de Gaulle did not win reelection for the presidency on the first ballot. His percentage of the total popular vote was 44 per cent on the first ballot, and 55 per cent on the second, which finally won him reelection. Although the major issue in the campaign was de Gaulle himself, his policies toward the Common Market, NATO, and the question of Germany's reunification were important factors contributing to his initial defeat. The tone of his campaign, especially after the first ballot, was most significant. He appeared to try harder than ever to defend his foreign policies and account for them to the people.

General deGaulle's political circumstances thus paved the way for France's return to the Common Market on January 17, 1966. This was a step calculated to disarm the growing opposition at home while averting a serious break with the Five, especially West Germany. But France's foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, at the opening session of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg, used an approach that was neither conciliatory nor appeasing. He presented his colleagues with a ten-point "directive" proposing far-reaching changes in the Executive Commission. Among other things, he proposed that its growing authority be reduced, that an earlier resolution on its merger with the executive commissions of Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community be implemented forthwith, and that its officers be rotated periodically. This last proposal was

designed to get rid of the Commission's president, Walter Hallstein of Germany.

The negotiations were deadlocked, postponed for a few days and, finally, resumed. Meanwhile, Germany's position was steadily hardening, and for the first time in the short history of the Common Market, France met real opposition. When the Council adjourned on January 31, all that France obtained was a vague agreement from the Five over some of her proposals. The Executive Commission's powers remained essentially intact; its replacement, and the rotation of its officers, remained subject to "prior agreement." The farm subsidy system was tied to the Common Market's resumption of participation in the Kennedy Round. A tentative timetable was substituted for France's firm deadlines for resolving pending issues. Finally, France's proposal that the rule of unanimity in voting be retained, despite the explicit provisions of the Treaty of Rome, was not fully accepted. Instead, an "agreement to disagree" was formulated.

The important question now is: where to go from here? The fundamental differences between France and her European partners over political integration remain as strong as ever; only the Common Market's political alignments have changed. West Germany has emerged from the last session of the Council of Ministers almost as decisive a power as France. But this only adds to the gravity of the situation by eliminating the element of compromise which has characterized the Common Market ever since it was established. In its absence, a serious con-

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"Behind French military policy today," writes this observer, "lies a continuing search for security through more status and influence within the necessary alliances and less military and political dependence on others."

French Military Policy

By ELIZABETH STABLER

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CURRENT MILITARY POLICY in France, not unlike French foreign policy, is personally guided by the president of the Republic. It thus reflects the distinctive style and lofty ambitions of General Charles de Gaulle. Perhaps more important, it reflects the impact of some decisive experiences of the French nation during the twentieth century, and some perennial French preoccupations.

During World War I, help for an embattled France did not arrive soon enough or in sufficient amounts to prevent the waging of an exhausting four-year struggle on French soil. During World War II, help from across the Channel could not prevent the rapid defeat of French forces and the occupation of France. A costly liberation followed four years later. During and following World War II, a search for more security led to alliances with the Soviet Union in 1944, with Great Britain in 1947, with the Benelux countries in 1948, and with the United States and other Western European nations in 1949.

But along with the alliances has risen a tendency to question the reliability of alliance partners. This tendency was reinforced as it became apparent that France did not have the support of important allies when what she regarded as vital interests were at stake—in planning occupation policy in Germany, in considering German rearmament and the abortive European Defense Community, dur-

ing the Suez expedition and the wars in Indochina and Algeria. Within the Atlantic alliance especially, French military and political officials have sometimes felt isolated, misunderstood and frustrated.

Behind French military policy today lies a continuing search for security through more status and influence within the necessary alliances and less military and political dependence on others. There is also a determination to acquire the visible power that will give France an important voice in events affecting her security in all parts of the world. And it should not be forgotten that when France looks to the east on the European continent, she sees not one, but two, redoubtable powers—the Soviet Union and West Germany.

The wars France has fought in the twentieth century have left other scars. During World Wars I and II, it became evident that the French military establishment and armed forces were neither doctrinally equipped nor materially prepared to fight the kind of wars that developed. In Indochina, the difficulties posed by severe shortages in manpower and equipment were compounded by errors in strategy and tactics.

In Algeria, equipment and manpower were not lacking. But some influential members of the military establishment became convinced that theories of revolutionary warfare provided an answer to all the problems faced

by France. The cause of Western civilization could be defended only by adopting the tactics (including terror), the militant ideology and the political apparatus of the enemy.

Disillusionment and revolt followed when it became evident that there would not be a chance to test fully the validity of these theories.

Behind French military policy today, therefore, there also lies a concern for the revitalization and direction of military thought into safe channels. French armed forces must be equipped with the most modern weapons, which means first and foremost nuclear weapons. The armed forces must be reorganized and their missions redefined to meet the most likely threats and to reflect new relations with former French territories. The military services must be able to attract professionals who will be loyal and highly motivated, and who will respond adequately to the challenges of modern science and technology.

In order to recruit such men, however, the morale of the armed services must be high. Within the services there must be a feeling that the military establishment is part of the nation, that it is respected by civilians and heard by the government. There must be unity rather than division among competing political factions. During much of the twentieth century these conditions have been lacking. One need only refer to the passions and divisions aroused by the Dreyfus Affair of the turn of the century, the mutinies of 1917, the Popular Front of the 1930's, the defeat of 1940 and the installation and fall of the Vichy regime. No conscripts were sent to fight in Indochina, where successive

governments of the Fourth Republic could bring themselves neither to withdraw nor to make a major war effort. The final agony came during the Algerian war with the fall of the Fourth Republic, army revolts, incitements to military disobedience from right and left, and trials for insubordination.

French military policy today is clearly motivated in part by a desire to heal the wounds of the recent and more distant past, to reconcile the army and the nation, and to restore unity and pride to the armed services. Viewed from this angle, an independent military stance and opposition to integration in the Atlantic alliance become conditions not only of political independence but also of national renewal and of healthy and stable civil-military relations.¹

NEW MILITARY POLICY

De Gaulle did not await the end of the Algerian war to establish the guidelines of military policy under the Fifth Republic. His displeasure with the structure of the Atlantic alliance and with patterns of consultation among Western powers was made evident in 1958. As early as 1959 (de Gaulle's first year as president of the new Republic), steps in the reorganization of the military establishment were taken. Above all, the effort to produce nuclear weapons—an effort initiated between 1954 and 1956 under the governments of Pierre Mendès-France, Edgar Faure and Guy Mollet—was accelerated.² To this end a four-year program envisaging the creation of a nuclear striking force was pushed through a reluctant national assembly in the fall of 1960.³ The end of the Algerian war in 1962 freed funds and energies for even bolder political-military initiatives, for more far-reaching reorganization of the armed forces and for more ambitious nuclear weapons projects and an expanded national effort in space.

A NUCLEAR FORCE

By the end of 1965, a small nuclear striking force—the so-called *force de frappe*—was in existence. It consisted of between 40 and 50 Mirage IV A supersonic planes armed

¹ See, for a more extensive discussion of the above problems, Edgar S. Furniss, *De Gaulle and the French Army* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1964); Raoul Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1953); George Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965); Jean Planchais, *Le malaise de l'armée* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958).

² For details on the French nuclear program under the Fourth Republic see Lawrence Scheinman, *Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

³ Successful tests of a fission device earlier in the year had made France the fourth nuclear power.

with 60 kiloton atomic bombs in various states of operational readiness. By the end of 1966, it is hoped that most of the planned 62 Mirages will be operational and armed with an improved version of the French bomb. It is expected that the expensive Pierrelatte plant in southeast France will be producing sufficiently enriched uranium by mid-1967 to provide the means for building and testing thermonuclear bombs and warheads. Because the Evian agreements of 1962 provide for the abandonment of the Sahara test sites by mid-1967, construction of a new test site for bombs has been undertaken in the Pacific near Tahiti. In southwest France, a missile-launching test site has been prepared with a tracking station in the Azores. The first missile tests are expected to take place sometime in 1966. Also in 1966, it is hoped that France's first Polaris-style missiles can be test-fired from an experimental submarine now nearing completion.

Thus, with a first generation striking force still only partially in existence, France has committed herself to second and third generation forces. The second generation force, as presently conceived, will consist of about 25 two-stage solid-fuel ground-to-ground missiles. Preparation of sites for these missiles in southwest France is expected to begin in the fall of 1966. The first silos may be ready by 1968, if protests from the population in the region do not entail significant delays. One or two missiles may also become operational in 1968, if appropriate warheads can be rapidly developed. The successful launching in late 1965 of a French satellite by an all-French three-stage rocket made France the third power in space and showed that, after prolonged initial difficulties, France had made impressive strides in missile technology.

The third generation of the striking force

will consist of at least three nuclear submarines, each armed with 16 Polaris-type missiles with thermonuclear warheads. With one submarine already under construction, a second is to be started early in 1966. By 1970, it is hoped that the first of the missile-bearing submarines will be operational, and by 1972, it is hoped that three will be in existence.

The French striking force as presently constituted is a major weapon in de Gaulle's diplomatic arsenal. Some critics—French as well as others—have contended, however, that the force is so small and vulnerable that it cannot be taken seriously from a military viewpoint. In order to reach major Soviet targets and to return from their missions, the Mirages must be refueled in flight—presumably over Eastern Europe—by 12 KC 135 tanker-planes sold to France by the United States. And, despite their speed and low-level flight capability, their ability to penetrate Soviet defenses is doubted.

Official and non-official French theorists have defended the credibility of the French force as an independent deterrent.⁴ Some have viewed it as plugging a gap in the credibility of American nuclear forces as a deterrent to aggression in Europe.⁵ General Charles Ailleret, the French chief-of-staff, recently criticized the American doctrine of flexible response, and insisted that "characterized aggression by the Soviet Union against Western Europe, whether by conventional or nuclear means, must be met by immediate strategic nuclear strikes against the war potential of the Soviet Union."⁶ He defined "characterized aggression" as any move above the level of border incidents. While not denying the utility of conventional and tactical nuclear forces following such strikes, General Ailleret argued that reliance on these means in conjunction with a bargaining strategy to meet any initial Soviet attacks could only bring about the destruction and occupation of large areas of Europe and lessen the effectiveness of Western deterrent forces.

These views have a following in Europe, and especially in West Germany. It will be

⁴ See, for example, Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961).

⁵ See, for example, General André Beaufre, "Dissuasion et stratégie," *Revue de défense nationale*, Vol. 20, Dec., 1964, pp. 1874-1881.

⁶ See Général d'Armée Ailleret, "Opinion sur la théorie stratégique de la 'flexible response,'" *Revue de défense nationale*, Vol. 20 Aug.-Sept., 1964, pp. 1323-1340; English translation in *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, Fall, 1964, pp. 413-428.

interesting to see if they are modified as the capability becomes more varied and more sophisticated, if indeed work on that capability is continued into the 1970's.

Aside from tanker-planes, American aid for French nuclear efforts (in contrast to aid for British efforts) has been minimal. Moves by the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the late 1950's to provide assistance in the building of a nuclear submarine and to anticipate other forms of assistance encountered strong and decisive congressional opposition. Following the Nassau accords of late 1962, in which the United States agreed to sell Polaris missiles without warheads to Great Britain, and Great Britain agreed to commit her nuclear forces to multilateral and multinational projects in NATO, President John F. Kennedy offered to negotiate similar accords with France. De Gaulle refused the offer on the ground that the aid being offered to the French force—as yet in its beginning stages—was inappropriate, and that the price being asked for that aid—integration rather than coordination of forces—was too high. A last attempt to bargain for French co-operation was made in the summer of 1963. Following the conclusion of the limited test ban treaty, President Kennedy offered to assist the French in perfecting techniques of underground testing if the French would sign the treaty. The offer was not pursued by the French.⁷

De Gaulle has never asked for American aid for French nuclear efforts. But the fact that it has not been forthcoming may have caused surprise and resentment among some French officials. It has been obvious that doubts in various parts of official Washington concerning the political and military reliability of France have never been overcome. To these doubts have been added an increasing concern for the problem of nuclear proliferation, fear that West Germany might seek to emulate the French nuclear effort,

and new United States obligations under the test ban treaty not to aid or encourage the carrying out of nuclear weapons tests above ground or under water. France did not sign the test ban treaty, and at present is planning above-ground tests in the Pacific. Thus in recent years, French officials seeking to buy in the United States even nonmilitary equipment that could be used in a nuclear weapons program have returned empty-handed.

French nuclear forces represent at present less than one per cent of the West's total nuclear forces. In the early years of the Fifth Republic, there was every reason to think that technical and material difficulties in building a striking force might prove for a long time insurmountable. Today, many of these difficulties have been overcome, and ambitious plans for the future show new confidence that remaining problems can and will be overcome. But it has been frankly acknowledged that progress in the nuclear realm has been achieved at the expense of reorganization and reequipment in the conventional realm. And those French military experts who are unwilling to rely totally on nuclear forces and the present doctrine of massive retaliation to assure French security believe that the needs of the conventional forces are being dangerously neglected.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The most striking recent change in French conventional forces is the reduction in numbers that has been taking place since the end of the Algerian war in 1962. Reserves called up for the Algerian emergency have been released, and a large number of officers, especially in the army, have been strongly encouraged to retire. The total armed forces of France numbered 1,200,000 men in 1956. In 1962, they still numbered over one million. By the end of 1965, they numbered less than 560,000. An army of over 800,000 men in 1961 had shrunk to an army of about 330,000 men by the end of 1965.⁸

Both planned and unplanned reductions in the armed services led the French government to abandon the traditional system of

⁷ See Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 572-574.

⁸ For statistics on current French forces, see *The Military Balance, 1965-1966* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965).

universal military service with complex rules for exemptions and deferrals. A much-criticized law making this change received the final approval of the national assembly in the summer of 1965. The law is avowedly a transitional measure for a period during which the pool of draft eligible men will grow, while the manpower needs of the armed forces decline and the funds necessary to recruit a largely professional army remain unavailable. The government rejected suggestions that it maintain universal military service with a short period of training, citing the 16 months of service agreed upon as the minimum service essential to produce the required technical proficiency.

FRANCE IN AFRICA

The end of the Algerian war and reductions in manpower in the armed forces have brought a sharp decline in the French military presence in Africa. The French Foreign Legion, which numbered as many as 40,000 men in 1954, has dropped to less than 9,000 members. The Legion is now based in southern France and has been assigned tasks in preparing the test site in the Pacific and in constructing a center for launching space vehicles in French Guiana. The only French troops remaining in Algeria are about 4,000 men stationed at the French naval base of Mels-el-Kebir. The French lease on this base expires in 1977. In Africa south of the Sahara, France still stationed some 28,000 military personnel in 1964. These troops have now shrunk to about 6,600, stationed chiefly at the six air bases France maintains in former French territories.

France still has agreements to provide various forms of military assistance to some of the new African states. One such agreement led to intervention at the request of President Léon Mba of Gabon to crush a February, 1964, coup against his government. It seems unlikely that such requests will be frequent, and if they are made, they may

be refused. France has given herself the means to intervene, however. Stationed in southeastern France is a recently reorganized parachute division which has been provided with the equipment necessary for high mobility and rapid intervention in regions lying outside France.

In addition to this division, five others have been planned for the army, of which four are now in existence.⁹ Lack of funds, however, has slowed purchases of new means of transport and modern equipment for these divisions. And it has been estimated that by 1970, only three divisions will have been completely reorganized and modernized. The development of tactical nuclear weapons for the armed forces has also been postponed due to shortages in funds and nuclear material for military purposes, with these weapons not expected to become available until 1972.

FRANCE IN NATO

During the Algerian war, almost four divisions were withdrawn from NATO command to serve in Algeria. At present, only two French divisions and the First Tactical Air Force are assigned to NATO command. These forces number about 65,000 men. They are stationed in southern Germany and are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons under United States control. There is no sign that France will increase her commitment to NATO. There has been every sign since 1958 that de Gaulle dislikes even the limited degree of integration that has been achieved in an organization that perpetuates American influence on the Continent, that he believes that European military integration in the foreseeable future would not be free of this influence, and that he disagrees with American strategic doctrine.

All French naval units and high naval officials have been withdrawn from NATO command. Neither NATO stockpiles of United States nuclear warheads nor forces for which these warheads have been provided are accepted on French soil, because French control over their possible use has been denied. France has refused to par-

⁹ See *France and Its Armed Forces* (New York: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, 1964).

ticipate in the recently formed McNamara strategy committee,¹⁰ has opposed projects for giving West Germany more access to the management and control of alliance nuclear forces, and has given notice that neither French forces nor French officers assigned to NATO headquarters will participate in NATO-wide maneuvers scheduled for the fall of 1966.

While opposing integration, de Gaulle has accepted the idea of coordinating French forces with other alliance forces, especially in the nuclear realm, although strategy disagreements would presumably have to be ironed out before such coordination could take place. De Gaulle and other spokesmen for the government have also consistently distinguished between the Atlantic alliance and NATO, professing their fidelity to the former, which remains necessary, and insisting increasingly that the latter must be reformed.

No official proposals for reform have yet been made, and it seems likely that there is some disagreement within the government as to just when they should be made and how drastic the changes proposed should be. Meanwhile, uncertainty hangs over NATO strategic plans and the whole structure of the organization, and over the future of United States bases in France, the NATO infrastructure network in France, and NATO and SHAPE headquarters located in and near Paris.

It seems clear that France does not feel particularly threatened by the Soviet Union at the present time, that she is counting on the American nuclear umbrella for the time being, and that she believes that the alliance can go through a period of uncertainty and perhaps substantial change without falling

¹⁰ This committee was originally proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in May, 1965, as a select committee of four or five NATO members. By late November, 1965, it had become the Special Committee for Nuclear Consultation, composed of defense ministers from ten NATO countries and divided into three subcommittees. The objective behind the committee is to improve strategic nuclear planning and consultation on the use of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

¹¹ See *The Economist* (London), November 21, 1964, p. 814.

apart. These attitudes as well as the hostility that French aims and tactics have sometimes aroused in other European countries probably explain why France has not made greater efforts to promote European military cooperation. However, France has concluded a number of recent agreements with Great Britain to work on nonnuclear military projects of mutual interest. Such agreements with West Germany have been largely foreclosed by arrangements between the United States and Germany for joint weapons projects and large German arms purchases in the United States.

A SIX-YEAR PROGRAM

Present trends in French military policy raise a number of questions. These concern budgetary problems, interservice disagreements, and domestic opposition to the government's military program. A second military program outlining plans and costs for the six-year period 1965 through 1970 was passed by the national assembly late in 1964. On the basis of this program, and considering military budgets in recent years, it has been estimated that France will spend between \$28 and \$30 billion on her armed forces during these years of which \$5.5 billion has already been earmarked for the nuclear effort.¹¹ If these sums are not exceeded, if prices remain relatively stable, and if the French economy maintains an adequate rate of growth, it is estimated that military expenditures will not greatly exceed five per cent of GNP. Government spokesmen compare these figures with military ex-

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Declaration of Honolulu

On February 7, 1966, South Vietnamese and United States leaders opened two days of bilateral conferences in Honolulu on the problems in Vietnam facing both nations. At the close of the meeting on February 8, South Vietnamese chief-of-state, Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, together with President Lyndon B. Johnson, issued an official declaration. The text of this declaration follows:

Part I

The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America jointly declare: their determination in defense against aggression, their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam and their commitments to the search for just and stable peace.

In pursuit of these objectives the leaders of their Governments have agreed upon this declaration, which sets forth:

The purposes of the Government of Vietnam,

The purposes of the Government of the United States,

And the common commitment of both Governments.

Part II

The Purposes of the Government of Vietnam

Here in the mid-Pacific, halfway between Asia and North America, we take the opportunity to state again the aims of our Government. We are a Government—indeed a generation—of revolutionary transformation. Our people are caught up in a mortal struggle. This struggle has four sides.

[1]

We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil. We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression—that so-called “war of national liberation”—is part of the Communist plan for the conquest of all of Southeast Asia. The defeat

of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

[2]

We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people. We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment, despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes.

[3]

We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people. In spite of the war, which creates many unusual and unpredictable economic situations, we are determined to continue with a policy of austerity; to make the best possible use of the assistance granted us from abroad; and to help our people achieve regular economic growth and improved material welfare.

[4]

We must build true democracy for our land and for our people. In this effort we shall continue to imbue the people with a sense of national unity, a stronger commitment to civic responsibility. We shall encourage a widened and more active participation in and contribution to the building of a free, independent, strong and peace-

ful Vietnam. In particular, we pledge again:

¶ To formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law.

¶ To take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification.

¶ To seek its ratification by secret ballot.

¶ To create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.

These things shall be accomplished mainly with the blood, intelligence and dedication of the Vietnamese people themselves. But in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others:

To win the war of independence; to build while we fight; to reconstruct and develop our nation when terror ceases.

To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Vietcong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

¶ Come safely to join us through the open arms program.

¶ Stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children.

¶ Come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom and peace those in the North would deny the people of Vietnam.

Thus, we are fighting this war. It is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution.

Part III The Purposes of the Government of the United States

[1]

The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Vietnam to prevent aggression. This is the purpose of the determined effort of the American armed forces now engaged in Vietnam. The United States seeks no bases. It seeks no colonial presence. It seeks to impose no

alliance or alignment. It seeks only to prevent aggression, and its pledge to that purpose is firm. It aims simply to help a people and government who are determined to help themselves.

[2]

The United States is pledged to the principles of the self-determination of peoples, and of government by the consent of the governed. It therefore gives its full support to the purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam and to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. The United States will give its full support to measures of social revolution, including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

[3]

Just as the United States is pledged to play its part in the worldwide attack upon hunger, ignorance and disease, so in Vietnam it will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight.

We have helped and we will help them—to stabilize the economy, to increase the production of food, to spread the light of education, to stamp out disease.

[4]

The purpose of the United States remains a purpose of peace. The United States Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum. The world knows the harsh and negative response these efforts have thus far received. The world should know, too, that the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam remain determined that no path to peace shall be unexplored. Within the framework of their international commitments, the United States and Vietnam aim to create with others a stable peace in Southeast Asia which will permit the governments and peoples of the region to devote themselves

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON FRANCE

LOST SOLDIERS: THE FRENCH ARMY AND EMPIRE IN CRISIS, 1947-1962.
By GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLEY. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 404 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Mr. Kelly traces and discusses the stages of the French army's transformation from an arm of the civil power to a contender for that power and rebel against it. Isolated and lacking bearings after 1945, the military were first involved in a losing war in Indochina, then sent to spend their blood in an Algeria also due to be abandoned despite all promises to the contrary. Loyalties invested in these tasks turned against the politicians and institutions whose indecisiveness made for weakness, confusion and failure. Material energies were deflected from obedience to rebellious initiatives and, finally, the soldiers appealed from the State they felt had let them down to the Nation whose interests they claimed to incarnate.

This and much more is clearly indicated in Mr. Kelly's pages. The wars the army fought were political wars, integral parts of worldwide conflicts, always affected by these wider struggles and by France's internal politics. The problems the army faced were of a revolutionary nature, suggesting solutions well beyond the range of combat. Hard experience politicized the soldiers, involving them in social, economic and psychodemagogic activities hitherto outside their realm. From the enemy they learned the theories of revolutionary war which they tried to apply—first in the field, then against the State they served—to carry out the tasks which they had been assigned. This later precipitated rebellion, the awkward and ultimately unsuccessful attempt of the arm to become head.

Lost Soldiers is an interesting and thoughtful book, sensitive, perceptive,

sometimes confusing and sometimes fascinating. It is the more suggestive since the problems to which French soldiers and French order succumbed are being faced again by Americans, and with no more apparent success.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

THE FALL OF PARIS. By ALISTAIR HORNE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. 458 pages, illustrations, maps and index, \$6.95.)

In the late summer of 1870, France went to war with upstart Prussia and the glory of the Second Empire collapsed abruptly after a few weeks of inept soldiering. But the Franco-Prussian war was not to be settled before Paris had suffered a long and costly siege. France's civilian leaders had words but no deeds, her generals some skill but no drive, her soldiers courage but no discipline, her people spirit but no sense. While Paris starved, attempts to alter the fortunes of war by raising new armies in the provinces failed. Paris surrendered and peace was concluded with a foe who had begun the war as King of Prussia and ended it as German Emperor, annexing two French provinces whose loss only made defeat more bitter to endure and an enduring peace less likely of achievement.

Then Paris rose again—the poorer part of Paris—against the provincials and the property owners who had accepted the defeat but had never spared their fellow-citizens. It fought from March to May, 1871, only to fall once more, this time to Frenchmen who wreaked on it a vengeance more savage than any foreigner could have conceived.

This is the tale that Mr. Horne tells with style and spirit. First the siege and then
(Continued on page 247)

A NEW FRANCE

(Continued from page 200)

vators choose to stay in the provinces and to teach or experiment there.

Progress in Latin countries, and indeed in the greater part of a world in which the Angle-Saxons and the Scandinavians remain a minority, has often been achieved through revolutions rather than through a gradual evolution. A great many minor changes are thus crystallized into a more momentous upheaval, individual wills are magnetized and, once drastic moves forward have occurred, a period of assimilation of these changes follows. It may well be that the French, after a prolonged seven-year itch of stability, are, in 1966, feeling nostalgic for some turbulence. The tone of a leader who is convinced of his own infallibility and his imperious style of action may well pall on them. They have achieved security, economic advance, social peace, freedom from fear of war in Europe and of colonial wars, scientific progress and a truly democratic education for all. They are not likely to rest happy and probably bored in such a prosperity, repeating to themselves the very un-French line of Alexander Pope: "One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right."

But the profound modifications which have been effected in the social structure and in the mental adaptation of the French people to the modern world are likely to stay, as will probably a fair degree of governmental stability and of executive predominance over a rule by an Assembly. France has gone a longer way to adapt herself to the technological world of today within the twenty years since she emerged, scarred and impoverished, from German occupation than she had travelled for a full century.

TRAGIC VICTORY

(Continued from page 208)

rand's strength lay in his discovery that that was no longer true; and he implied that,

elected president, he would turn the actual administration of the government over to the leader of the majority in the new Assembly who would probably be Lecanuet. Until Lecanuet and the conservatives are ready to do the same for Mitterrand, parliamentary government in France will remain elusive.

STILL A DICTATORSHIP

De Gaulle understood from the start, and has now publicly demonstrated, that his presidential regime, combined with a central administration, no matter how efficient, benevolent or even "constitutional," is still a dictatorship. And even though it is in no sense "fascist" (witness the lack of a party) personal rule is bound, sooner or later, to run counter to the interests and wishes of the citizens. So long as de Gaulle confined his attention to the resolution of the war in Algeria, he had the full support of the French. But having sensed the country's needs so accurately on one or two occasions, how could he be so mistaken and intractable about Europe, for example? Is it conceivable (as it appeared on the surface) that he was willing to sacrifice the best hopes not only of the French but of the entire West to avenge a slight encroachment on his personal authority? Much of what is so compelling about tracing the role of de Gaulle in France revolves about such questions.

Unquestionably, the most tragic revelation of the drama was the character and personality of Charles de Gaulle. Flaws were always visible and frequently denounced: irascibility, meanness, treachery and malevolent arrogance, but most of us had come to accept them as the necessarily exaggerated traits of a truly monumental figure dedicated to the total and passionate service of a single great ideal. We knew he had nothing but contempt for the French but we forgave him, ran one postelection comment, "because we believed he had identified himself with France; now we know he identifies France with himself." And so our play ends unresolved. It is too late to cry "*vive de Gaulle*," and too soon for "*vive la France*."

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from page 213)

possible in the past. Once again, the Germans might be induced to give way, removing the last major hurdle before the Market. As for voting, the seeming gulf between majority and unanimity might turn out, upon closer inspection, not to exist at all. On matters of importance, as defined by France, the others would certainly not wish to proceed against a French veto. In fact, the operating principle of many international organizations could be followed: consultation to arrive at a consensus, formal voting—if at all—to record that consensus. Prior consultation in just the private, politico-diplomatic atmosphere de Gaulle sought would enable the others to use all possible techniques of cajolery, bargaining, persuasion and pressure, without placing France or the others in the predicament of adhering doggedly to a position publicly fixed. Perhaps France was itself pointing the way when, in proposals eight and nine, it called for “proper neutrality” by the Commission “in public statements concerning the policy followed by the Governments” and for an information policy not “devised and implemented by the Commission alone, but jointly by the Council and the Commission.”

With a single structure for all three communities, perhaps the “integrative imperative” would again have a chance to work on the national leaders and sectors clinging to anachronistic sovereignty. As for France itself, only an aging president held the Gaullists together. Previous years had revealed the presence in the national assembly of a “European majority”; the presidential election, if it had not brought that majority to the polls, had at least shown that de Gaulle could no longer command a majority against two leading contenders supporting “Europe.” Who, indeed, would inherit?

THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

So might run the calculations of the other five. For de Gaulle, however, the struggle

for the organization of sovereign states was not confined to the United Nations and the Economic Community. An even longer, more important, more bitter battle raged over the future of the Western Alliance and its creation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. De Gaulle’s threat to withdraw from the latter, while retaining some sort of membership in the former, was only the culmination of an increasingly acerbic Franco-American dialogue stretching back to the fateful decision of the United States to force upon its reluctant allies the rearmament of West Germany. “So long as the solidarity of the Western peoples appears to us necessary for the eventual defense of Europe,” the president of France announced, “our country will remain the ally of her allies [doubtless a carefully chosen phrase], but upon the expiration of the commitments formerly taken—that is, in 1969 by the latest—the subordination known as ‘integration’, which is provided for by NATO and which hands our fate over to foreign authority, shall cease, as far as we are concerned.” By 1966, little French presence remained in NATO, the estrangement having been accelerated by the obtrusive pressure exerted by the United States for the Multi-Lateral Nuclear Force (M.L.F.) and by the conflict between Gaullist concepts of the meaning of sovereignty and American interpretations of NATO base rights in France.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the sorry record of United States “diplomacy” concerning the M.L.F. Whatever may have been its merits in the eyes of a few policy advisers, to France—not just to de Gaulle and his cohorts—it looked like a device for perpetuating United States hegemony within the alliance by using the German-American axis as the controlling arrangement for alliance nuclear development. Not only did the proposal seek to negate the national nuclear program expensively initiated by the Fifth Republic; it did its bit to pull apart the Franco-German agreement on which de Gaulle had hoped to build his edifice of West European cooperation. “I cannot forget,” said General P. M. Gallois, perhaps

the most notable private defender of the *force de frappe*,

the American attitude when, in 1963, Germany and France—divided during so many years—signed their famous treaty of cooperation. The American press was against it. We also have seen U. S. policy strongly opposed to France's efforts to find herself modern means of self-defense—a nuclear force. We were invited to provide just foot soldiers to the collective system of security.

"To speak of integration in atomic matters," said an article in *Politique Étrangère*, "boils down, even more than with conventional forces, to accepting an equivocation which in truth, has affected the Atlantic Alliance for fifteen years now: namely, to hiding behind a word the acceptance in fact of the domination of the strongest."

In the French view, "integration," whether in a multilateral nuclear force or in conventionally armed commands, was a device to restrict the autonomy of just one country—France. It did not hamper the United States or even its junior partner, Great Britain. Small allies with few forces of their own gained some protection. West Germany was supposedly under special limitations; NATO membership moved to cover the creation of a new German army. "NATO" bases in France were yet another symbol of American domination over the Alliance. De Gaulle asked that nine be returned to French control, charging that a secret agreement of 1954 had been violated, since the French had not been consulted on their use by Americans in time of crisis. The explanation that there had been no crisis did not assuage Gaullist sensibilities. The base at Evreux, Under Secretary George Ball was reminded, had taken Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville, that at Chateauroux had served as a rally point of United Nations troops on their way to the Congo. The bases had been used without prior knowledge, consultation or approval, said France, for maneuvers in August, 1965. Adding injury to insult, American planes had used the bases in September, 1965, as take-off points for photographic reconnaissance of the French atomic installation at Pierrelatte.

Beginning in 1969, 20 years after its signing, the North Atlantic Treaty may be subjected to reconsideration, with a view to modification. Given de Gaulle's determination to change the Western Alliance, what specifically did he want? "There has been a sibylline silence about French proposals for the reform of the Organization," wrote the editors of the British journal *Survival*. But the article from *Politique Étrangère* which they appended, with the statement that "authorship must undoubtedly be attributed to those close to the heart of policy-making," contained no surprises to anyone grasping the elementary Gaullist strategy differentiation between the Alliance (necessary) and the Organization (obnoxious). Quite simply, de Gaulle wishes to retain the former, in other words the Treaty, and dismantle the latter. The article called for

a new conception of the Alliance which, instead of going toward more integration, should follow the opposite path, so as progressively to restore a real liberty of action for its members. In other terms, it would be a question of promoting the progressive transformation of the Organization created with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and its evolution toward a simple treaty of Alliance.

Such an alliance would fulfill Gaullist objectives of placing France in the foremost councils of the world. Above the regional system would be a global one, within which Allied policies would be coordinated. The regional system itself would rest on the principles of cooperation among states geographically close and having common interests. Great Britain might fit into the latter, but France would clearly be the leader, in military as in political terms. "It should not involve any participation of Germany in the decision to employ the atomic weapons," until a "single European government were formed"—if ever—"the guarantee of intervention by the French atomic weapons would be given to the Federal Republic for its defense." Unlike NATO, the two systems would be not closed ones. Quite the contrary, "it is conceivable that a vast reform of this type, combined with various openings towards the East, may make it possible to

make some start with a regrouping of all the European countries."

A settlement of European problems promoted by the loosening of hierarchic alliances East and West, the inclusion of *Eastern Europe* and the *Soviet Union* in particular, functional agreements leading toward a secure, viable continental system—this was de Gaulle's grand design. Deliberately emphasizing his country's noninvolvement in contemporary United States statecraft, de Gaulle might ask about our sense of national purpose. Does the United States, slipping into the great war on the Asian continent it has avoided for a century, have a better objective, a more practical course it can now prescribe for its Western Allies? Does NATO, product of the bipolar world, ideological participant in the cold war, have a more plausible plan for enlarging the frame of Soviet responsibility, for separating a Russia committed by self-interest to peaceful behavior from its bellicose, erstwhile partner in Communist adventurism? Does West Germany, waxed powerful on its ties to the United States, see a wider, speedier road to reunification in preserved peace and enhanced security?

For all its domestic antidemocratic flavor, Gaullism is far more than a deluded, selfish scheme to resurrect the Europe of the seventeenth century. With logic based on national interest and persistence born of decades of national service, the president sees in a European past, when France was a directing force, a valuable guide to surmounting the dangers of the present, and removing Europe from the list of potential sources for a new and more successful effort at human self-destruction.

THE FRENCH COMMUNITY

(Continued from page 220)

sibilities which result from this situation," the prime minister of Quebec has written.⁹

Agreements between East European coun-

⁹ "Le Canada Français," *Le Monde*, November 9, 1965 (special supplement).

tries like Rumania and Bulgaria, where French is still spoken, permit these countries to assert some independence from the Soviet Union. The same attitude influences some Latin American leaders with regard to the United States. Ties with Lebanon and Iran may be strengthened. Saint Joseph's University in Beirut is a French university and is a French cultural center in the Middle East. In both Cambodia and Laos, French is used extensively in schools, and leaders of these countries have looked to France for leadership. Although France has little political influence in Vietnam at present, its cultural influence is strong and France may well play a future role.

President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia said on a recent trip to other African countries that a francophonic commonwealth should be organized. Because of the great diversity of the countries where French is an important language or where there is support for independent French policies, it is unlikely that such a commonwealth would be as important to France as the present ties with the former African colonies. It is also unlikely that members of such a commonwealth would be willing to follow French leadership as closely as the former members of the Community.

Nonetheless, with comparatively few resources France has made use of the concept of community at two levels to further its own national interest. Both exist above considerations of race, religion, national identity and ideology. In the process of reasserting its own importance in international affairs, partly through these communities, France has made a contribution to the weakening of a rigid and dangerous polarization of the world.

FRENCH PLANNING

(Continued from page 227)

quirements of her Grand Chef as supersonic jet planes, space exploration and nuclear weapons. The trends in output, investment and prices in the course of this year will show whether the French official spokesmen were right in their self-confidence or whether the critics were justified in their scepticism.

FRENCH PLANNING: AN APPENDIX

[A] THE FIVE FRENCH REPUBLICS

The monarchical system was overthrown by the French Revolution (1789–1793) and succeeded by the *First Republic* which, in turn, was followed by the First Empire under Napoleon (1804–1814) and the restored monarchy (1814–1848). The *Second Republic* was the product of the revolutionary year 1848 and it lasted until 1852; it was followed by the Second Empire (1852–1870). The *Third Republic* was established after the military defeat of the Second Empire by Prussia and it lasted from 1871 until World War II. The *Fourth Republic* was established in 1946. It was followed by the *Fifth Republic* which was officially created on January 8, 1959, when General Charles de Gaulle was inaugurated as its president; its new constitution was adopted by a referendum on September 28, 1958.

[B] TWO DECADES OF ECONOMIC PLANS*

1946–1952/3: The first development plan (known as the Monnet Plan)

1954–1957: The second development plan

1958–1961: The third development plan (combined in its last two years with an interim plan)

1962–1965: The fourth development plan, to which was superimposed—

1963: The stabilization plan (price controls placed temporarily on all manufactured goods; partly relaxed in 1965 after replacement by so-called stability contracts between the government and the basic industrial sectors)

[C] PRODUCTION

GNP in 1964 \$88.1 billion

GNP per capita in 1964 \$ 1.8 thousand

Origin of 1964 GNP (at market prices):

..... agriculture 8%

..... mining and manufacturing 38%

..... construction 8%

..... services and other 46%

Monetary unit: the Franc (4.9 Francs = 1 U.S. \$)

[D] FRANCE'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Land:

Area 551,000 sq. km.

Cultivated area 188,000 sq. km.

Principal crops (in millions of metric tons; 1962)

Wheat	14.0	Oats	2.6
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Wine grapes ..	7.5	Corn	1.9
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Barley	6.0	Cabbage9
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Cider apples ..	4.2	Table apples ..	.8
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The rise in overall agricultural productivity averaged 4.2% per year during the 1949–1961 period, compared to 3.2% for the whole French economy. Despite this, the output per man remained far behind American standards: in 1961, one farm worker in France could feed 10 persons, while his counterpart in the U.S. could produce enough food for 38 persons.

The People:

Population on January 1, 1965	48,492,700
Excess of births over deaths (1964)	358,000
Crude birthrate (1964)	18.5 per 1,000
Active population segment (1963)	42.6%
Share of European population (U.S.S.R. omitted): 18% in 1800, 13.3% in 1900, 11% in 1960.	

Energy Supply:

In 1965, France covered her primary energy needs as follows: 49% by solid fuels, 35% by petroleum products, 11% by hydroelectricity, 4.5% by natural gas, .5% by nuclear energy. She imports 30–40% of her energy production needs annually.

Industrial Materials:

From the 69 raw materials listed by the U.N. as essential to modern industry, France produces 29. Above her own needs, she produces exportable quantities of iron ore, bauxite, gypsum, and potassium. She has to supplement by imports most other minerals. She also depends on imports for all her cotton, jute, natural rubber and vegetable oils.

[E] FRANCE'S FOREIGN TRADE IN 1964

Exports:

\$ value of exported goods (f.o.b.)	8,995 million
Exports of goods and services	

(percentage of 1964 GNP)	14.5%
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Main exports (percentage of total†):	
food, beverage and tobacco	15.8%
machinery and electrical equipment	14.3%
steel	10.9%
chemical products	9.7%
textiles	6.8%

Imports:

\$ value of imported goods (c.i.f.)	10,070 million
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Imports of goods and services	
(percentage of 1964 GNP)	14.6%

Main imports (percentage of total†):	
energy and lubricants	16.7%
machinery and electrical equipment	12.7%
food, beverage and tobacco	12.1%
steel	11.2%
chemical products	5.9%

* Excluding franc area (former French colonies and territories where the French franc is still the monetary unit).

FRANCE AND THE MARKET

(Continued from page 231)

flict would permanently shatter the Treaty of Rome and reduce the Common Market to a customs union.

However, should Britain apply again for membership in the Common Market, her admission would be assured as would be her role in reestablishing a more realistic realignment of powers. After all, outside the delicate area of their respective relations with the United States, France and Britain are not too far apart on global policies, especially toward West Germany. Britain's admission might even pave the way for better Common Market relations with Eastern Europe, one of de Gaulle's favored projects.

THE U.S. POSITION

What about the United States? Whether or not the Common Market becomes a federation of states, our vital interests will not be affected, although a strong and united Common Market, or a federated Western Europe, is extremely important to the West's global policies. Even a paralyzed Common Market may not greatly affect American business, for the individual members have become economically powerful enough to carry on by themselves. But a divided Common Market, whose future is at best uncertain, would obstruct the progress of the Kennedy Round, in which we have a vital stake, and no doubt will for some time.

France remains the key to the entire situation. She does not oppose the Common Market, but she opposes its political use and application. This opposition, in turn, does not originate from a predictable disadvantage to France in a united Europe, but from Europe's entire postwar commitments. It is likely, therefore, that France's future course in the Common Market will be determined by countless extraneous issues, primarily by the role of the United States in Europe. In this particular area, it is almost impossible to ascertain whether France has lost or won by its seven-month boycott.

FRENCH MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 237)

penditures approaching 11 per cent of GNP in 1953 and 8 per cent of GNP in 1958.

Most observers believe, however, that the above assumptions are questionable, and especially that expenditures on the nuclear forces will inevitably grow beyond \$5 billion and will perhaps approach \$10 billion. If they are correct, either the total military budget will have to be increased, or even more drastic sacrifices in the reequipment and modernization of conventional forces will have to be made.

In either case, the domestic opposition to the French military program will be reinforced with new arguments, and interservice rivalries and disagreements will be intensified. The latter have become more open in recent years. The army has raised doubts about the usefulness of the Mirage planes of the air force. The army has pushed its claims for tactical nuclear weapons against claims by the air force to exclusive responsibility for all nuclear missions. There has been evidence that the army does not wish to see its function reduced to that of a "trip-wire" and seeks a combat role that extends beyond its means.

Within the country, those who completely oppose the French nuclear effort and the present level of military expenditures are probably a minority. Nevertheless, there has been increasing consciousness of the costs of the striking force in recent years. And the longer it appears that there is no immediate threat to Western Europe from the East, the more resistance to expenditures amounting to even only five per cent of GNP may develop. Added to this possibility is the fact that there may be a legislature hostile to the government following the elections of 1967. If this were to happen, the government might have to make some important modifications in its foreign and military policies in order to retain the bare essentials of its military program.

If by chance, an opposition regime should

displace a Gaullist regime in the future, the opposition will face the problem of how to make good on its somewhat contradictory promises to convert the Pierrelatte plant to peaceful purposes, to abandon the nuclear striking force, to work for a European nuclear force and European military integration, to withdraw all French troops from the alliance, to strengthen the French role, within the alliance while restoring French cooperation within NATO, and to sign the test ban treaty and join the Geneva disarmament negotiations. It seems likely that such an opposition regime might find itself in quandaries similar to those of the present British Labour government, which promised to end independence in the nuclear realm and to phase out the British deterrent, but has not yet succeeded in doing so.

Perhaps equally important, a new French regime would face the problem of a military establishment that had been promised highly significant national responsibilities, only to see them denied by an unsympathetic political regime and an indifferent public. In this respect, as well as others, the present regime may have substituted new myths for old myths and thus have laid the basis for some difficult policy choices in the future, and for some unrest and instability.

HONOLULU DECLARATION

(Continued from page 239)

to lifting the condition of man. With the understanding and support of the Government of Vietnam, the peace offensive of the United States Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured.

Part IV The Common Commitment

The President of the United States and the chief of state and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again:

To defense against aggression,
To the work of social revolution,
To the goal of free self-government,

To the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease,

And to the unending quest for peace.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 240)

the revolutionary Commune are chronicled from the rich materials left by scores of eyewitnesses. The gory that was Paris in 1870–1871 comes to life and the reader feels the exasperation, the thrill or the despair of a participant in the furies, follies and fortunes of a great city. Here is a skillfully written book and a judicious one; good reading for student and laymen alike.

E. W.

THE MURDER OF ADMIRAL DARLAN.

By PETER TOMPKINS. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. 287 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

On November 8, 1942, allied forces landed in North Africa. The more or less determined opposition of French Vichy forces lasted 48 hours; cost a great many lives, and was followed by far more bitter struggles for political advantage. American bungling and clumsiness, French political divisions, the inept hesitations of political generals and admirals, the ineffective bravery of a few resists, the tardiness of allied military action, produced a tragicomedy of errors. This misplaced heroism and stupid waste was costly in reputations and, what is more, in lives, of which Admiral Jean Darlan's—murdered on Christmas Eve after having turned from a German puppet into an American one—was certainly the most deservedly lost.

Clear, well-written, prejudiced (against Vichy and reaction, for de Gaulle and resistance), documented (but with few verifiable references), immensely readable and well worth reading, Mr. Tompkins' page of history is also a rip-roaring adventure story. Unfortunately, at the end, the latter somewhat takes over from the former.

E. W.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of February, 1966, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month In Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND
Instructor, Department of History, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Feb. 17—At the 17-nation disarmament conference meeting in Geneva, the Soviet Union accuses the United States of having "flagrantly" violated the 1963 treaty for a partial ban on nuclear tests. The Soviet delegate says last month's crash of a U.S. jet carrying nuclear bombs threatened to contaminate the high seas around Spain.

Feb. 26—In answer to the Soviet charge, the U.S. sends a note to the Soviet Union saying that the area was not polluted and that such flights are necessary to meet the threat posed by "the huge nuclear forces of the Soviet Union . . ."

European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.)

Feb. 3—The Coal and Steel Community Authority approves a \$15-million loan for construction of roads in southern Belgium to attract new industry to replace the scheduled closing of unprofitable coal mines. The Authority also announces it will grant \$13 million for the retraining of 4,000 displaced Belgian miners.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See France)

Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.)

Feb. 28—Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, gives the opening speech at the foreign ministers' meeting of the Organization of African Unity.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

(See also Dominican Republic)

Feb. 2—The O.A.S. council adopts a resolution condemning a move by a newly formed Asian-African-Latin American group to extend "wars of liberation" to Latin America.

United Nations

Feb. 2—The Security Council votes to debate the United States draft resolution seeking a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

Feb. 17—Secretary-General U Thant emphasizes that he is continually seeking to arrange for Vietnam negotiations.

AUSTRALIA

Feb. 14—Australia shifts from the pounds-shillings-pence (pound sterling) monetary system to the dollars-and-cents (decimal) system.

Feb. 19—Concluding a two-day visit, U.S. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey pledges that Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia will be stopped because "the U.S. and its allies will not let it win."

BELGIUM

(See also Int'l. European Coal and Steel Community)

Feb. 3—Two miners killed January 31 in clashes with policemen are buried amid increased political tensions. Several thousand miners are protesting the planned closing of six unprofitable coal mines. The government announces an intensified drive to bring in new investment, particularly

from U.S. companies, to create new jobs for the miners.

Feb. 4—Premier Pierre Harmel submits the resignation of his Social Christian-Socialist cabinet to King Baudouin. The action follows a day-long futile discussion with doctors and health insurance officials on medical fees.

Feb. 5—King Baudouin refuses to accept the resignation of Premier Harmel's cabinet and requests "a new and last effort" to solve the dispute with doctors over fees.

Feb. 6—In response to the personal intervention of the King, a doctors' strike is postponed. But the national federation of doctors warns that it reserves the right to set a new strike date if negotiations fail.

Feb. 10—Objecting to government plans for the payment of certain health care fees, the Socialist cabinet members leave the coalition government.

BRAZIL

Feb. 3—The government reveals that in January the cost of living rose 5.1 per cent, with food prices increasing 9 per cent.

Feb. 5—The national security council, invoking revolutionary powers to modify the constitution, issues a decree calling for elections in September and October. The decree provides that the new president, the governors of 11 states and the mayors of state capitals will be chosen indirectly by legislative bodies. A new chamber of deputies, two-thirds of the senate and state legislatures will be elected directly by the people.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Feb. 6—*Jenmin Jih Pao*, the Communist Party organ, says that many senior army officers are resisting "ideological reform." The officers are warned that they must demonstrate their political reliability if they wish to maintain their present positions.

Feb. 10—*Hung Chi*, the ideological journal of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, warns that North Vietnam

can never win its struggle against the U.S. unless it stops cooperating with the U.S.S.R.

Feb. 15—Reports from Peking indicate that China has sharply reduced its economic aid to the nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa. Only \$50 million was pledged in 1965 as compared with \$330 million in 1964.

Feb. 22—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao* denounces Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and implies he no longer has the respect of the Cuban people.

COSTA RICA

Feb. 6—José Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, a political newcomer, is elected president in a narrow victory over the candidate of the ruling National Liberation Party. He is backed by a coalition of conservatives and reformers.

CUBA

Feb. 6—Premier Fidel Castro bitterly attacks China for having curtailed its trade with Cuba. He accuses China of having betrayed the good faith of the Cuban people and of wishing to strangle his government economically. He indicates that Cuba's trouble with China started in September, 1965, when he objected to a "massive distribution" of anti-Soviet propaganda among Cuban military officers.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Feb. 1—The peace committee of the Organization of American States instructs leading generals of the 8,000-man peace force to order high Dominican military officers to obey their orders to leave the country.

Feb. 11—Brigadier General Enrique Perez y Perez becomes minister of the armed forces to replace Commodore Francisco Caminero.

Feb. 12—Commodore Caminero leaves to become Dominican naval attaché in Washington. A strike continues in protest against the refusal of army and air force leaders to leave the country.

FRANCE

Feb. 8—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and President Charles de Gaulle end 2 days of talks

in Paris. Observers indicate there is a major improvement in the atmosphere between them but no agreement on the problem of European unity.

Feb. 15—The government makes public a February 8 letter written to North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh by President de Gaulle. In the note the French president offers to "participate actively" in a settlement of the war "as soon as this appears possible."

Feb. 17—Reliable sources in Paris report that President de Gaulle has sent a harsh note to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson condemning the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and stating that military intervention in Vietnam is certain to be self-defeating.

For the first time, France successfully launches a satellite into orbit by means of a French rocket.

Feb. 21—President de Gaulle announces that France will reclaim control of foreign military bases on her soil by April 4, 1969, the date that NATO can be renounced by its members. He also warns that the remaining French forces in NATO will be withdrawn from control by the integrated allied command at that time.

GHANA

Feb. 24—The army seizes control of the government while President Kwame Nkrumah is en route to Peking. Major General J. A. Ankrah is named chairman of a seven-man national liberation council made up of police and army officers.

Feb. 25—in a statement read in Peking by former Foreign Minister Alex Quaison-Sackey, Nkrumah says he is still the constitutional head of Ghana.

At least 400 political prisoners are freed in Accra.

Feb. 28—The National Liberation Council suspends the constitution; it will rule by decree. General Ankrah warn "all nations to keep out of our problems"; he declares in a radio address that Ghana will now pursue the principles of nonalignment "in theory and in practice."

GREAT BRITAIN

(See *United Kingdom*)

GREECE

Feb. 4—Foreign Minister Elias Tsirimokos threatens reprisals against Turks living in Greece if the Turkish government continues its "persecution" of Greeks in Turkey.

Feb. 12—Foreign Minister Tsirimokos gives two conditions for resuming negotiations with Turkey for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute: that no settlement bar a future union of Cyprus with Greece; that no settlement be based on partition of the island.

Feb. 16—The trial of Bishop Chrysostomos, charged with having usurped the office of Bishop of Piraeus, opens in Athens. He is the first Greek bishop ever to be tried by lay judges.

Feb. 18—Bishop Chrysostomos is sentenced to two months in jail, but the sentence is suspended.

HUNGARY

Feb. 3—Reports from Budapest indicate that the government of Premier Janos Kadar has come under heavy criticism at public meetings over its price increases on basic consumer goods and services.

Feb. 19—*Nepszabadsag*, organ of the ruling Communist Party, reveals the arrest during the last several months of a large number of persons on charges of "conspiring" against the government. One group of those arrested apparently includes members of a Roman Catholic organization, Regnum Marianum, associated with Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty. The second group consists of individuals who took part in the 1956 uprising.

INDIA

Feb. 1—The leader of India's pro-Peking Communists, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, is arrested after he advocates continued demonstrations in Kerala against the reduction in the rice rations.

Feb. 11—The government's handling of the

food shortage sets off an open revolt against the leadership of the ruling Congress Party at its annual conference.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi writes to President Johnson appealing for immediate resumption of U.S. economic aid, suspended during the Indian-Pakistani fighting.

Feb. 17—In New Delhi, U.S. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey announces a \$100-million loan to India.

Feb. 19—Prime Minister Gandhi concludes two days of talks with leaders of the Nagaland underground in the first meetings ever held between the rebel leaders and a prime minister.

Feb. 20—Leaders of the Nagaland underground cancel a meeting with members of parliament after receiving telegrams describing alleged government attacks on Naga villagers.

Feb. 25—Indian troop withdrawal from Pakistani territory is completed, in accord with the deadline set in the agreement at Tashkent in January.

Feb. 28—Foreign Minister Swaran Singh announces that Prime Minister Gandhi will start a 4-day visit to the U.S. March 27.

INDONESIA

Feb. 13—The Jakarta radio reports that Indonesia has recalled her ambassador to Communist China because of the "unfriendly attitude" adopted by Peking.

Feb. 21—President Sukarno dismisses Abdul Haris Nasution, the defense minister responsible for crushing the abortive Communist-led coup in October.

Feb. 24—As 14 new cabinet ministers are installed, hundreds of students demonstrate against the new cabinet and in support of General Nasution. Troops use bayonets and warning shots to quell the demonstrations.

Feb. 25—President Sukarno dissolves the pro-army Indonesian Student Action Front after it stages a protest demonstration in Jakarta. A curfew and a ban on demonstrations are imposed.

Feb. 28—President Sukarno states that any attempt to oppose the leftist course of the revolution will fail.

ITALY

Feb. 23—Ending a 33-day government crisis, Premier-designate Aldo Moro presents his four-party coalition cabinet to President Giuseppe Saragat.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Feb. 28—The South Korean government reveals its decision to double its forces in Vietnam, which now number 21,000.

LEBANON

Feb. 1—It is revealed that yesterday President Charles Helou dismissed 14 leading diplomats. In a move toward a more efficient civil service, eight ambassadors and six officials at the foreign ministry with rank of ambassador are replaced.

PAKISTAN

Feb. 15—Arriving in Pakistan, U.S. Vice-President Humphrey discloses that the U.S. plans a \$50-million loan to the Karachi government.

Feb. 20—The government reacts strongly to a statement made by Vice-President Humphrey in Australia to the effect that Pakistan is "fully aware of the threat of Communist China." Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto says there is no such threat to Pakistan and that, although Pakistan accepts U.S. economic aid, it rejects any limitation on its foreign policy.

PORTUGAL

Feb. 11—Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira announces that the government plans to establish formal trade agreements with Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

RHODESIA

Feb. 2—The minister of justice accuses the opponents of the regime of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith of having formed a "shadow

cabinet" prepared to take over the country if requested to do so by the royal governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.

Feb. 8—The government assumes new major powers of press censorship. Magazines and newspapers are forbidden to mention the fact that material is censored or to leave white space to indicate material deleted by officials.

Feb. 10—In a nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Smith declares that Rhodesia is winning the battle to survive the economic sanctions imposed by Britain. He warns Britain not to expect an easy victory if she attempts military measures.

Feb. 11—In what is regarded as a gesture to the country's unemployed black Africans, the government bars Africans of neighboring countries from coming to Rhodesian towns to look for jobs.

SAUDI ARABIA

Feb. 24—Washington reports indicate that King Faisal has appealed to President Johnson for diplomatic and military support, including air power, if the United Arab Republic resumes the fighting in Yemen.

SOUTH AFRICA

Feb. 18—It is reported in Johannesburg that South Africans have been shipping 25,000 to 45,000 gallons of oil to Rhodesia daily, roughly half of Rhodesia's requirements under rationing. Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd is not expected to succumb to British pressure to end the oil shipments.

SPAIN

Feb. 4—Riot policemen break up an anti-American demonstration by 600 Spaniards in Madrid protesting the use of Spanish bases by U.S. armed forces. The protests arise after the January 17 collision of two, U.S. jets and the subsequent fall of four unarmed nuclear bombs on Spanish territory and coastal waters. One bomb is still unrecovered.

Feb. 10—The supreme court sharply reduces the prison sentences of 12 Communists, including three underground leaders.

SYRIA

Feb. 23—The left wings of the military and of the Baath party seize power. Most government officials are under arrest. Reports indicate that the leader of the coup is Major General Salah Jadid, chief of the armed forces until his dismissal in September, 1965.

Feb. 25—In a decree broadcast by the Damascus radio, the military junta names Nureddin Attassi chief-of-state; Yussef Zayen is named premier. Attassi and Zayen were forced out of office in a coup in December, 1965.

UGANDA

Feb. 22—Prime Minister Milton Obote announces he has assumed "all the powers of the government" and has arrested five members of his cabinet.

Feb. 26—Prime Minister Obote announces that a judicial inquiry will investigate parliamentary charges of corruption against him and two close advisers.

Former Deputy Commander Idi Amin takes charge of the armed forces, replacing Sabama Opoloto.

U.S.S.R., THE

Feb. 2—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin proposes a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against countries which have no such weapons on their territory.

Official statistics reveal that in 1965 the Soviet Union reversed the decline in its rate of industrial growth. Consumer production increased by 8.5 per cent, capital goods by 8.7 per cent. But farm output increased by only 1 per cent compared to a 12 per cent increase in 1964.

Feb. 3—in the first such landing in history an unmanned Soviet spaceship makes a successful "soft" landing on the moon. The ship immediately begins sending telemetric signals, including television pictures, back to earth.

Western embassies in Cairo hear that recently the Soviet Union refused to sell weapons to the United Arab Republic, but

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

- it promised the U.A.R. nuclear protection if Israel obtains or develops such weapons.
- Feb. 6—The government grants permission to Valery Tarsis, an antigovernment writer, to lecture in Britain.
- Feb. 10—The trial of two writers accused of slandering Soviet communism in manuscripts smuggled to the West for publication begins in Moscow. The writers, Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel, plead not guilty.
- Feb. 14—The supreme court sentences Sinyavsky and Daniel to 7 and 5 years of hard labor respectively; their works are judged harmful to the Soviet regime.
- Feb. 19—The central committee of the Communist Party approves Premier Kosygin's draft directives for a new five-year plan, and his diplomatic policy outlines.
- Feb. 21—The government strips Valery Tarsis, lecturing in Britain, of his citizenship.
- Feb. 22—A satellite carrying two dogs is launched into space in a "new biological experiment" to prepare man for an important space effort, *Tass* announces.
- Feb. 23—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet officials conclude three days of Moscow talks with no significant results announced.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

- Feb. 15—The government takes steps to destroy the illegal Muslim Brotherhood. It announces the indictment of 45 members on charges of having plotted last year to kill President Gamal Abdel Nasser and overthrow his regime.
- Feb. 22—President Nasser denounces the latest U.S. arms sale to Israel and accuses Washington and London of backing a new conservative coalition in the Middle East to oppose Arab revolutionaries. He also attacks the Shah of Iran, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia's King Faisal. He threatens to keep U.A.R. troops in Yemen for five years if necessary to establish a republican regime.

Feb. 1—Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip leave for a five-week tour of British dependencies and Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean.

Feb. 7—in an effort to restore Britain's balance of payments equilibrium by the end of 1966, the government imposes new restrictions on installment credit.

Feb. 11—The House of Commons gives a second reading to a bill to reform the law on homosexual conduct.

Feb. 19—Protesting the government's decision to replace aged aircraft carriers with U.S. long-range bombers, Christopher Mayhew resigns as minister of the navy.

Feb. 22—Following a 15-month defense review, the government announces major military and diplomatic policy changes. Chief among these is the decision to reduce overseas forces by one-third in the next four years while maintaining a major role east of Suez.

Feb. 24—Returning from an official visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Harold Wilson says that no substantive agreement on major issues was reached during his talks.

Feb. 28—Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces that Parliament will be dissolved March 10; general elections will be held three weeks later.

The government announces that it will discuss the problem of British control of Gibraltar with the Spanish government in April. Spain proposed the talks in January.

BRITISH TERRITORIES

British Guiana

- Feb. 4—Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip arrive in Georgetown on the first step of a Caribbean tour. When the Queen addresses parliament, the Opposition benches are empty in response to a boycott called by Cheddi B. Jagan's People's Progressive Party.

UNITED STATES, THE**Civil Rights**

Feb. 7—A federal court at Montgomery, Alabama, orders the Lowndes County jury commission to destroy its present jury roll and draw up a new one without regard to race.

Feb. 9—While ruling that the Texas poll tax does not seriously discriminate against Negroes, a three-judge federal court rules the tax unconstitutional because it is "an invalid charge on one of our most precious rights—the right to vote."

Feb. 10—A three-judge federal panel upholds the Georgia house of representatives in its refusal to seat Julian Bond.

Feb. 17—An all-white jury in Anniston, Alabama, finds Johnny Ira Defries not guilty of the slaying last July of Willie Brewster, a Negro foundry worker.

The Southern Regional Council begins a campaign to help register 2 million eligible but unregistered Negroes in 11 southern states.

Foreign Policy

Feb. 1—President Lyndon B. Johnson requests \$3.38 billion for foreign aid for fiscal 1967, the smallest appropriation request in the 18-year foreign aid program.

Feb. 2—President Johnson, in a special message to Congress, urges prompt passage of health and education acts for a global attack on ignorance and disease.

Feb. 4—The State Department notifies Staughton Lynd, of the Yale University faculty, and Herbert Aptheker, a member of the American Communist Party, that their passports have been "tentatively withdrawn" as a result of their illegal visit to North Vietnam in January.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins public hearings on U.S. policies regarding Vietnam. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara refuses to testify at the open sessions.

The President orders the immediate ship-

ment of an additional three million tons of grain to India for famine relief.

Feb. 5—The State Department reveals that the U.S. has been selling M-48 Patton tanks to Israel. West Germany canceled a U.S.-supported arrangement to sell arms to Israel last year when the United Arab Republic threatened to recognize East Germany if the Israelis received arms from West Germany.

Feb. 7—As two days of conferences between U.S. and South Vietnamese officials begin in Honolulu, President Johnson and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky agree that social and economic reform is the key to winning the South Vietnamese war against Communist aggression and infiltration.

Feb. 8—In the Declaration of Honolulu, the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam (South) stress a combination of military action and civic reform programs to be used in the fight against the National Liberation Front and the allied North Vietnam forces. (For the text of this document, see pp. 238 ff.)

President Johnson announces he is sending Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to Saigon to study South Vietnamese reform measures.

Retired Lieutenant General James Gavin tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that while he believes the U.S. should retain troops in South Vietnam, he fears any major increase of U.S. troops will involve the risk of war with China.

Feb. 10—George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. should decide what can be securely held in South Vietnam and then "dig in and wait" for a political solution.

Feb. 16—The Senate begins hearings on a bill authorizing \$4.8 billion in emergency military appropriations for Vietnam.

Feb. 17—General Maxwell Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former ambassador to Saigon, tells Senate committee members that the administration intends to fight only a "limited" war in Vietnam.

Feb. 18—Secretary of State Dean Rusk testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He maintains that the SEATO treaty gives the U.S. a legal basis for sending troops to Vietnam. Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright maintains that no vital U.S. interests are at stake in Vietnam. Public hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into U.S. policy in Vietnam end.

The executive board of the maritime unions (A.F.L.-C.I.O.) votes to invoke a boycott against ships of foreign nations trading with North Vietnam.

Feb. 19—Senator Robert Kennedy suggests that the United States should consider offering representatives of the National Liberation Front (Vietcong) a share of power in South Vietnam as the best hope of reaching a negotiated settlement.

Feb. 22—White House officials and Senator Kennedy indicate that they are in agreement on some of the steps to achieve a peaceful settlement in Vietnam; their disagreement on the precise role of the N.L.F. continues.

State Department officials disclose that West Germany and Italy oppose a U.S. proposal for a nuclear planning committee as a substitute for the creation of an allied nuclear force.

Feb. 23—in New York, President Johnson says the U.S. is not caught in a "blind escalation of force" in Vietnam that may lead to a wider war. He pledges to honor the result of free elections in South Vietnam.

Feb. 24—Vice-President Humphrey reports to congressional leaders on the results of his nine-nation Asian tour.

Feb. 26—at a news conference at the White House, President Johnson indicates that the debate on Vietnam does not seriously challenge his policy.

Feb. 28—Senate Democrats agree to avoid a vote on any amendment to the supplemental military appropriation bill that would indicate criticism or approval of the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Government

Feb. 2—Contempt-of-Congress citations are voted by the House against the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America and six of his Grand Dragons.

Feb. 7—the government increases from 5.25 to 5.5 per cent the maximum interest rate on home mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration.

Alabama's law excluding women from jury service is declared unconstitutional as of June 1, 1967, by a three-judge federal court.

Feb. 8—the Senate falls 15 votes short of the necessary two-thirds approval needed to halt debate on the administration's measure to repeal Section 14-B of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act.

Feb. 10—Senate Democratic leaders say no further attempt will be made this year to repeal Section 14-B.

The Senate passes and sends to the White House the new G.I. Bill of Rights measure providing educational and housing benefits for veterans with more than 180 days of active military service since 1955. The administration wanted the benefits limited to veterans who have served in danger zones overseas.

Feb. 11—President Johnson nominates his special counsel, Lee C. White, for the chairmanship of the Federal Power Commission and Elmer B. Staats, deputy director of the budget, as Controller General.

Feb. 14—the President asks Congress for a supplemental appropriation of \$56 million for the National Teacher Corps, the rent supplement program and the selective service system.

Feb. 26—the President appoints Andrew F. Brimmer, presently assistant secretary of commerce for economic affairs, to the Federal Reserve Board. He is the first Negro to be named to the board.

Labor

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 17—the presidents of the building trades unions reject administration efforts

to restrict wage increases in the building industry. They also turn down a proposal suggested by Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz for settling disputes in the industry.

The president of the United Mine Workers, W. A. Boyle, says he cannot be bound by the government's noninflationary guideposts in this year's soft coal negotiations. Feb. 21—Following a meeting between top labor leaders and Secretary Wirtz, George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., says organized labor refuses to accept the administration's guideposts on wages and prices.

Military

Feb. 25—A spokesman for the Selective Service Administration announces several dates for optional college qualification tests to be given draft registrants claiming student exemption status. Qualification tests and college class standing are to be used as criteria by local draft boards.

Feb. 26—The first stage of the Apollo program is successfully completed when an unmanned suborbital spacecraft is launched by a Saturn 1B booster.

Feb. 28—The two Gemini 9 astronauts scheduled for a flight in May or June are killed when their jet trainer crashes in St. Louis.

Supreme Court

Feb. 28—The Supreme Court gives approval to reapportionment plans for both houses of the Arkansas legislature and for the Wyoming Senate. The plans were previously approved in lower courts.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Feb. 1—As the U.N. Security Council begins discussion on the Vietnam war, the North Vietnam foreign ministry warns that the Security Council has no right to deal with the matter and that any resolution it may adopt "intervening in the Vietnam question would be null and void."

Feb. 11—North Vietnamese diplomatic officials in Cairo warn that their government

intends to try U.S. military prisoners as "criminals against humanity" under North Vietnamese law.

Feb. 12—Articles in official North Vietnamese publications *Hoc Tap* and *Nhan Dan* attack a "pacifist" minority within the government.

Feb. 14—Hanoi denounces a Somali proposal for an Asian-African committee to explore ways of ending the fighting.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 7—Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and chief-of-state Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu confer in Honolulu with U.S. President Johnson.

Feb. 8—Following the Honolulu conferences, Premier Ky says he will not negotiate with or recognize the Vietcong and indicates he has little interest in peace negotiations with North Vietnam.

Feb. 10—U.S. Vice-President Humphrey arrives in Saigon for three days of visits to rural-pacification projects and U.S. troop installations.

Feb. 11—Both U.S. Vice-President Humphrey and Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman make inspection trips of rural areas.

Feb. 23—The Saigon government reports that, in 1965, some 113,000 men deserted from the South Vietnamese armed forces.

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 25—In a speech to the central committee of the Communist Party, President Tito says high-level party officials are impeding economic reform.

ZAMBIA

Feb. 26—President Kenneth Kaunda bars strikes in the copper industry and restricts to a rural area a white miners' union leader, following a strike of some 100 white miners.

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